In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978), the Court explained that a judge acts in "absence of jurisdiction" only if that judge knows the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter: 'A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend.' 435 U.S. at 356 n.6. In deciding whether a judge acted in "clear absence of all jurisdiction," the scope of jurisdiction must be broadly construed and assessed at the time of the challenged action. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. If the judge did not clearly act without subject-matter jurisdiction, judicial immunity applies even if the judge's action was in error, illegal, done maliciously, or was performed in excess of authority. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. The Stump court illustrated the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction as follows: If a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 n.7.