In Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985), the high court analyzed the prosecution's use of an accomplice's confession at trial to rebut the defendant's testimony "that his own confession was coercively derived from the accomplice's statement." (Street, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 410.) The court noted that "this case is significantly different from its previous Confrontation Clause cases . . . where hearsay evidence was admitted as substantive evidence against the defendants." (Id. at p. 413.) "In this case," the court further noted, "the prosecutor did not introduce the accomplice's out-of-court confession to prove the truth of the accomplice's assertions . . . but to rebut respondent's testimony that his own confession was derived from his accomplice's." (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court held that "the nonhearsay aspect of the accomplice's confession -- not to prove what happened at the murder scene but to prove what happened when respondent confessed -- raises no Confrontation Clause concerns." (Id. at p. 414.) The jury in Street was "pointedly instructed by the trial court 'not to consider the truthfulness of the accomplice's statement in any way whatsoever.'" (Street, at pp. 414-415.) "The assumption that jurors are able to follow the court's instructions fully applies when rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause are at issue." (Id. at p. 415, fn. 6.) The United States Supreme Court found no violation of confrontation rights had occurred at a trial in which the defendant testified that a confession he had made to a detective was coerced, such that he was forced to say the same thing as his accomplice had said in his own confession (both made out of court). The accomplice was not a testifying witness. In rebuttal, the prosecutor was allowed to call the detective as a witness, to read the accomplice's confession to the jury and then to explain the differences between the two confessions. The high court said that the purpose of the rebuttal testimony was not impermissible, and that the introduction of the accomplice's confession was not being done to prove the truth of what was said in it. Instead, the confession evidence had a nonhearsay purpose, to rebut the defendant's testimony that his own confession was coercively derived from the other one. (Id. at pp. 415-417.) Moreover, in Street, supra, 471 U.S. 409, the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the law enforcement witness who presented that information against him, and there was no deprivation of his right to cross-examine the accomplice, since the accomplice's confession was not being presented for its truth. The jury was properly given the opportunity to compare the two confessions, to decide whether the defendant was telling the truth about his defense of "the immediate issue of coercion" of his confession. (Id. at p. 416.) The trial judge had appropriately instructed the jury to limit its use of the evidence in a manner consistent with the confrontation clause.