In Trammel v. United States (1980) 445 U.S. 40, the United States Supreme Court determined that a husband could not prevent his wife, who had been granted immunity, from testifying against him. The United States Supreme Court reviewed the history of the privilege: "Writing in 1628, Lord Coke observed that 'it hath beene resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband.' This spousal disqualification sprang from two canons of medieval jurisprudence: first, the rule that an accused was not permitted to testify in his own behalf because of his interest in the proceeding; second, the concept that husband and wife were one, and that since the woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the husband was that one. From those two now long-abandoned doctrines, it followed that what was inadmissible from the lips of the defendant-husband was also inadmissible from his wife. "Despite its medieval origins, this rule of spousal disqualification remained intact in most common-law jurisdictions well into the 19th century.. . . . It was not until 1933, in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, that this Court abolished the testimonial disqualification in the federal courts, so as to permit the spouse of a defendant to testify in the defendant's behalf. Funk, however, left undisturbed the rule that either spouse could prevent the other from giving adverse testimony. The rule thus evolved into one of privilege rather than one of absolute disqualification. "The modern justification for this privilege against adverse spousal testimony is its perceived role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship." (Trammel v. United States, supra, 445 U.S. at pp. 43-44 100 S. Ct. at p. 909.) The United States Supreme Court further explained: "The long history of the privilege suggests that it ought not to be casually cast aside. That the privilege is one affecting marriage, home, and family relationships--already subject to much erosion in our day--also counsels caution. At the same time, we cannot escape the reality that the law on occasion adheres to doctrinal concepts long after the reasons which gave them birth have disappeared and after experience suggests the need for change." (Trammel v. United States, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 48.) "Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that ' "the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence." ' As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted 'only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.' Here we must decide whether the privilege against adverse spousal testimony promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence in the administration of criminal justice." ( Trammel v. United States, supra, 445 U.S. at pp. 50-51 100 S. Ct. at p. 912.) "The contemporary justification for affording an accused such a privilege is also unpersuasive. When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding--whatever the motivation--their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve. In these circumstances, a rule of evidence that permits an accused to prevent adverse spousal testimony seems far more likely to frustrate justice than to foster family peace." ( Trammel v. United States, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 52.) The Supreme Court concluded: "Our consideration of the foundations for the privilege and its history satisfy us that 'reason and experience' no longer justify so sweeping a rule . . . . Accordingly, we conclude that the existing rule should be modified so that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying. This modification--vesting the privilege in the witness-spouse--furthers the important public interest in marital harmony without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs." (Trammel v. United States, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 53.)