In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), the parents of the deceased father of two children were granted increased visitation pursuant to an order issued under Washington's nonparental visitation statute, which allows any person to petition the court for visitation rights at any time and provides visitation rights may be granted to any person when it may serve the child's best interest. The Washington statute provides: "'Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances.'" (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 61, quoting Wash. Rev. Code, 26.10.160(3).) The children's mother had wanted to limit the paternal grandparents' visitation to once a month; however, the trial court found more extensive visitation with the grandparents was in the children's best interest even though there were no allegations or findings that the mother was an unfit parent. (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 61, 68.) The trial court made only two formal findings in support of the visitation order, namely (1) the grandparents are part of a large loving family located in the area and can provide the children access to cousins and music opportunities and (2) the children would benefit from spending quality time with the grandparents. (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 61-62, 72.) The paternal grandparents petitioned for visitation with children born out of wedlock under a Washington state statute allowing "any person" to petition for visitation rights at "any time" if it served the child's best interests. 530 U.S. at 60-61. The paternal grandparents were unhappy with the otherwise fit mother's decision to restrict their visitation to one short visit per month after their son, the father of the children, committed suicide. Id. In a plurality decision, the Supreme Court found the statute was unconstitutional as applied, based on a combination of several factors: (1) the mother was a fit parent and the trial court failed to recognize the presumption that she acted in her children's best interest; (2) the mother did not seek to completely deny visitation, but rather, merely sought to limit it; (3) the trial court failed to accord mother's decision any material weight; (4) the statute was overbroad in that it placed no limits on who could petition for visitation or the circumstances under which it could be granted. Id. at 67-71. In Troxel v. Granville, the United States Supreme Court plurality expressly declined to decide "whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. Instead, the plurality reasoned that the more neutral concept of "special factors. . . might justify the State's interference with the biological mother's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing" of her children. Id. at 68. When examining a legal parent's conduct to determine whether it is inconsistent with his or her constitutionally-protected status, the focus is not on whether the conduct consists of "good acts" or "bad acts." Rather, the gravamen of "inconsistent acts" is the volitional acts of the legal parent that relinquish otherwise exclusive parental authority to a third party. In Troxel v. Granville, the United States Supreme Court was asked to hold the State of Washington's nonparental visitation statute unconstitutional on its face. The plurality opinion noted that the primary constitutional question was whether the Due Process Clause requires all such statutes "to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation." 530 U.S. at 73. The plurality declined to resolve the facial challenge, agreeing with Justice Kennedy "that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best 'elaborated with care.'" Ibid. The United States Supreme Court held a Washington statute that authorized nonparental visitation with a child unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances before it. In Troxel, similar to the facts of this case, paternal grandparents petitioned for visitation with their grandchildren after the children's father died and the mother wished to limit the frequency of such visits. The grandparents' petition was filed pursuant to Revised Code of Washington section 26.10.160(3), which provided: "Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time, including, but not limited to custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances." (Troxel, at p. 61.) The Washington trial court found more extensive visitation with the grandparents were in the best interests of the children and issued an order to enforce visitation. (Id. at pp. 60-62.) The Washington Supreme Court granted review and ruled that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children, for two reasons. First, the court concluded that the Constitution permits a state to interfere with parental rights only to prevent harm or potential harm to a child, and the court determined that the Washington statute did not meet that standard because it required no threshold showing of harm. (Id. at p. 63.) Second, the Washington Supreme Court determined that the statute was overbroad -- allowing "any person" to petition for visitation of a child at "any time" so long as visitation served the best interest of the child. (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court, in a plurality decision, held that the Washington statute was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case. The plurality based its decision on a "combination of several factors" including (1) the absence of any allegation or finding that the parent was unfit; (2) the trial court's failure to give any special weight to the parent's determination concerning the children's best interests; and (3) the absence of any allegation that the parent had sought to eliminate visitation altogether. (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 68-72.) With regard to the first two factors, the plurality explained: "So long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children." (Id. at pp. 68-69.) The Troxel plurality made clear, however, that it was not prohibiting the state from ordering grandparent visitation altogether: "The problem here is not that the Washington Superior Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to the parent's determination of her daughters' best interests." (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 69.) While acknowledging that the decision whether to allow grandparent visitation "in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance," the plurality also indicated that a fit parent's decision regarding visitation can still be subject to judicial scrutiny: "If a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination." (Id. at p. 70.) The Troxel plurality was reluctant to rule that the Washington statute at issue, or any similar state statute, was unconstitutional on its face: "Because much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process clause as a per se matter." (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 73.) The plurality also adopted a cautious approach toward articulating constitutional standards in a sensitive area of law: "Because we rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of the Washington statute and the application of that broad, unlimited power in this case, we do not consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the Washington Supreme Court -- whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. We do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context. . . . The constitutional protections in this area are best 'elaborated with care.'" (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 73.) In Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a Washington State statute that permitted "'any person' to petition a superior court for visitation rights 'at any time,' and authorizes that court to grant such visitation rights whenever 'visitation may serve the best interest of the child'" (id. at p. 60), with no deference given to the parent's estimation of the child's best interest (id. at p. 67). After the paternal grandparents in Troxel filed a petition to obtain visitation rights with their grandchildren, the superior court ordered visitation more extensive than that desired by the mother. The Supreme Court held that the statute, as applied in that case, unconstitutionally infringed on the parent's fundamental right to make decisions regarding her children's care, custody, and control. (Id. at pp. 66-67.) The United States Supreme Court affirmed that the due process clause protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of their children. ( Id. at pp. 65-66.) There the court determined that a Washington statute under which grandparents were given visitation over the parents' objection was unconstitutional as applied. The Supreme Court was concerned that the trial court gave "no special weight" to the parents' determination of their daughter's best interest. ( Id. at p. 69.) The United States Supreme Court stated: "Because grandparents and other relatives undertake duties of a parental nature in many households, States have sought to ensure the welfare of the children therein by protecting the relationships those children form with such third parties. The States' nonparental visitation statutes are further supported by a recognition, which varies from State to State, that children should have the opportunity to benefit from relationships with statutorily specified persons-for example, their grandparents." Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court also recognized in the Troxel opinion that the parents' interest in the care, custody and control of their children "is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Court." Id. at 65. The Court affirmed a judgment of the Washington State Supreme Court which held that a Washington statute governing nonparental visitation infringed on a parent's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of her children and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive due process. The statute in question allowed any person to petition for and be granted visitation rights if such visitation was deemed to be in the child's best interest. The custodial mother in Troxel had attempted to limit, but not eliminate, visitation with her children's paternal grandparents. (Their father was deceased.) The trial court granted substantially more visitation than was desired by the children's mother, after finding that such visitation was in their best interest. In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court agreed that the Washington statute, as applied to the facts of the case, unconstitutionally infringed on the mother's fundamental parental rights. Although there was no allegation that the children's mother was unfit, her decision was not accorded the usual presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their children. Rather, the trial court required that she would have the burden of proving that visitation would not be in their best interest. Her decision concerning the best interest of her children was afforded no weight whatsoever, even though she was willing to allow some visitation as she deemed appropriate. The Court, relying on a long line of cases involving many aspects of family autonomy, reaffirmed its prior holdings that "the Due Process clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made." (Troxel v. Granville, supra, 530 US, at , 120 S Ct, at 2064.) The Court held the statute invalid, on substantive due process grounds, as impermissibly interfering with the "fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." ( Troxel v. Granville, supra, 530 US, at 66.) The Supreme Court's reasons for finding the Washington State court's intervention to be unconstitutional included the State court's failure to give any special weight to the parent's determination of the child's best interest, and that there was no requirement that the parent be shown to be unfit. The Court expressly declined to reach the question of whether parental unfitness was always a prerequisite in order to justify intervention in decisions concerning custody and visitation. It also suggested that intervention in custody and visitation decisions might be justified when the intervention was "founded on ... special factors," rather than merely a best interest analysis. ( Troxel v. Granville, supra, 530 US, at 68.) The plurality faulted the trial court for not according any special weight to the mother's determination of the children's best interest and for presuming the grandparents' request for visitation should be granted absent any adverse impact. (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 69 120 S. Ct. at p. 2062.) The plurality said the trial court effectively and erroneously had assigned to the mother the burden of disproving visitation would be in the best interest of her children, rather than properly requiring the grandparents to establish by some method that, in disallowing visitation, the mother was not acting in the best interest of her children. (Ibid.) "The decisional framework employed by trial court directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child." (Ibid.) In considering nonparental visitation petitions, Troxel teaches that courts must presume "that fit parents act in the best interests of their children." (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 68 120 S. Ct. at p. 2061.) "Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children." (Id. at pp. 68-69 120 S. Ct. at p. 2061.) Troxel further requires a court hearing a grandparent visitation case to give special weight to a parent's determination on what is in his or her child's best interest. (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 69 120 S. Ct. at p. 2062.) "In an ideal world, parents might always seek to cultivate the bonds between grandparents and their grandchildren. Needless to say, however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination." (Id. at p. 70 120 S. Ct. at p. 2062.) However, the high court's narrow holding left several issues unresolved. The plurality declined to decide whether a showing of harm or potential harm is required before nonparental visitation can be ordered. (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 73 120 S. Ct. at p. 2064.) Although calling for deference or special weight to be given to a parent's decision regarding his or her child's visitation, Troxel does not spell out exactly how much deference is required; it did not announce the standard of review that should be applied in protecting the parent's liberty interest in visitation matters. (Id. at pp. 73-74 120 S. Ct. at p. 2064.) Thus, by implication, Troxel abstained from applying the strict scrutiny standard of review usually utilized when a state action infringes on enjoyment of a fundamental right. Justice Thomas called for a strict scrutiny analysis. (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 80 120 S. Ct. at p. 2068 (J. Thomas opn.).) Finally, Troxel teaches courts should be cautious before declaring nonparental visitation per se unconstitutional. Notwithstanding the "breathtakingly broad" language of the Washington statute, the plurality chose not to declare the statute unconstitutional on its face. As the plurality noted, "the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best 'elaborated with care.' Because much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter." (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 73 120 S. Ct. at p. 2064.) Troxel held that as applied to the mother and her children, the nonparental visitation statute infringed on "the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children," a right guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 66.) More specifically, the application of that statute violated due process, in that it allowed any person to seek visitation at any time and it did not require the trial court to consider or defer to a parent's belief that visitation was not in the child's best interests. (Id. at p. 67.) Troxel acknowledged that there is a presumption that "fit parents act in the best interests of their children." (Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 68.) "'The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.'" (Ibid.)