In United States v. Chadwick (1977) 433 U.S. 1, Amtrak officials in San Diego observed a trunk or footlocker, unusually heavy for its size and leaking talcum powder, being loaded onto a train bound for Boston. Since the persons loading the footlocker matched a profile used to spot drug traffickers, the railroad officials gave the information, together with detailed descriptions of the suspects, to San Diego federal agents who in turn relayed the information to their counterparts in Boston. ( United States v. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. 1.) Federal narcotics agents met the train when it arrived two days later in Boston. The agents watched the suspects as they claimed the footlocker and a suitcase. Two of the suspects, Machado and Leary, lifted the footlocker from a baggage cart and sat down on it. The federal agents released a dog near the footlocker and, without alerting the suspects, the dog signaled the presence of drugs within the footlocker. ( United States v. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. 1.) A third suspect, Chadwick, joined the others and they hired an attendant to move the footlocker to Chadwick's waiting car. Machado, Leary and the attendant placed the 200-pound footlocker into the trunk of the car. While the trunk was still open, the federal narcotics agents arrested the three suspects. The suspects and car containing the footlocker were taken to the federal building in Boston and about an hour and a half later, the footlocker and luggage were searched without a warrant. The footlocker had been locked with a padlock and its regular lock. ( United States v. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. 1, 4-5.) The government had argued that the rationale underlying the automobile exception to warrantless searches should apply to warrantless searches of luggage and other similar closed containers. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that luggage and automobiles were analogous for Fourth Amendment purposes. The court observed that warrantless searches of automobiles were often justified because of their inherent mobility which often makes obtaining a warrant impractical. Aside from its inherent mobility, the court has recognized that a diminished expectation of privacy surrounds the automobile. For example, it is primarily used for transportation and not a residence or repository of personal effects, and often when on the public thoroughfares, its occupants and contents are open to view. Also, vehicles must be registered and operators licensed. Vehicles are subject to official safety inspections and are regulated as to how they may be operated on public streets and highways. (United States v. Chadwick, supra , 433 U.S. 1, 11-13.) The high court emphasized that the same factors that diminish the privacy aspects of the automobile do not apply to luggage. Luggage is not generally open to public view, nor is it subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a regular basis. Most importantly, the court stressed that, unlike the automobile, the primary function of which is transportation, "luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects," so that, "a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile." ( United States v. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. 1, 13.) Although at the time the footlocker was seized it was mobile, the footlocker had been immobilized and was under the exclusive control of the federal agents without "the slightest danger that the footlocker or its contents could have been removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained." Once the footlocker had been safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant. ( Id., at p. 13.) The Supreme Court in Chadwick noted the distinctions between the permissible scope of a search under Chimel v. California (1968) 395 U.S. 752, 762-763, and the scope of the search in question as follows: "warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the 'search is remote in time or place from the arrest,' , or no exigency exists. Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest." (Id., at p. 15.) The United States Supreme Court held only that the warrantless search of a double-locked footlocker which had been taken from the defendant's car and placed in a distinct building, was not justified under the automobile exception rule because it was not incident to an automobile search; was under the exclusive control of the federal agents; and there was no danger whatever that it or its contents could be removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained. The court also held that the search of the footlocker was not warranted as incident to an arrest either because the search was remote in time or place or no exigency existed, the search having been conducted more than an hour after the federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long after the defendants were securely in custody. The Supreme Court, however, left no doubt that its holding in Chadwick did not alter the existing exceptions to a warrantless search, especially the search incident to an arrest. Thus, significantly enough, the Supreme Court had the following to say: "When a custodial arrest is made, there is always some danger that the person arrested may seek to use a weapon, or that evidence may be concealed or destroyed. To safeguard himself and others, and to prevent the loss of evidence, it has been held reasonable for the arresting officer to conduct a prompt, warrantless 'search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control" -- construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.' Chimel v. California. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). "Such searches may be conducted without a warrant, and they may also be made whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the person arrested may have a weapon or is about to destroy evidence. The potential dangers lurking in all custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items within the 'immediate control' area reasonable without requiring the arresting officer to calculate the probability that weapons or destructible evidence may be involved. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, supra. However, warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the 'search is remote in time or place from the arrest,' Preston v. United States, 376 U.S., at 367, or no exigency exists." ( United States v. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. at pp. 14-15.) The Supreme Court rebuffed the government's suggestion that the warrant requirement be limited to the protection of "homes, offices, and private communications which implicate interests which lie at the core of the Fourth Amendment," and that warrantless searches be permitted on the basis of probable cause alone where "less significant privacy values are at stake." ( Id ., at p. 7.) Reaffirming its commitment to the warrant clause, the court found "important Fourth Amendment privacy interests were at stake" in the search of a doublelocked footlocker. ( Id ., at p. 11.) The Court, while asserting that "our treatment of automobiles has been based in part on their inherent mobility, which often makes obtaining a judicial warrant impracticable," acknowledged that "we have also sustained 'warrantless searches of vehicles... in cases in which the possibilities of the vehicle's being removed or evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not nonexistent,'" and explained "the answer lies in the diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile." (433 U.S. at p. 12.)