In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), defendant was charged with mail fraud involving a "check kiting" scheme. Shortly before trial, defendant's retained counsel withdrew. The court in response appointed a "young lawyer with a real estate practice to represent respondent, but allowed him only 25 days for pretrial preparation, even though it had taken the Government over four and one-half years to investigate the case and it had reviewed thousands of documents during that investigation." (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 649.) After defendant was convicted, he challenged the competency of trial counsel. In reversing defendant's conviction, the court of appeals did not find defense counsel had made any specific errors or that his representation prejudiced defendant. Instead, the court of appeals rested its reversal on the ground that no such showing was necessary "'when circumstances hamper a given lawyer's preparation of a defendant's case.'" (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 650.) In so doing, the court of appeals used five criteria to infer defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated: "'"(1) The time afforded for investigation and preparation; (2) the experience of counsel; (3) the gravity of the charge; (4) the complexity of possible defenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses to counsel."'" (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 652.) The Cronic court reversed the court of appeals. The court concluded the court of appeals erred in utilizing an inferential approach (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 653) and noted that these factors were "relevant to an evaluation of a lawyer's effectiveness in a particular case, but neither separately nor in combination did they provide a basis for concluding that competent counsel was not able to provide this defendant with the guiding hand that the Constitution guarantees" (id. at p. 663). The Cronic court instead identified three categories of cases that constitute per se violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel where prejudice is presumed: (1) the "complete denial of counsel" at a critical stage in the proceedings (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659); (2) counsel's failure to "subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing" (ibid.); and (3) the "likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small under the particular circumstances that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial" (id. at pp. 659-660). The Supreme Court reiterated the maxim that the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel and: That the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial. Absent some effect of challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated. Moreover, because we presume that the lawyer is competent to provide the guiding hand that the defendant needs, the burden rests on the accused to demonstrate a constitutional violation. There are, however, circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. Most obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel. The presumption that counsel's assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial. Id. "In United States v. Cronic (1984), 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, the Supreme Court held that a per se violation of the right to counsel exists ' when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.' Id. at 659, fn. 25. The court further observed there may be 'some occasions when although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without any inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.' Id. at 659-660. The United States Supreme Court recognized that circumstances may exist such that, "although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial." Id. at 659-660.The Supreme Court stated, in part: "'In some cases the performance of counsel may be so inadequate that, in effect, no assistance of counsel is provided. Clearly, in such cases, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to "have Assistance of Counsel" is denied.' " (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 654, fn. 11.) This footnote was not a definition of "totally absent" or the enunciation of a rule of constructive total absence. However, later in its opinion, the Supreme Court explained that "if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable." (Id. at p. 659.) A third circumstance relieving the defendant from establishing prejudice occurs when counsel is required to represent the defendant under circumstances that would prevent even competent counsel from doing so. (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 659-661.) In United States v. Cronic, the Supreme Court offered guidance on when counsel has rendered ineffective assistance. It explained, "the adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment requires that the accused have 'counsel acting in the role of an advocate.' The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted -- even if defense counsel may have made demonstrable errors -- the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated. As Judge Wyzanski has written: 'While a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators.' ." (Id. at pp. 656-657.) The Cronic court further cautioned, however, that "the Sixth Amendment does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." (Cronic, supra, at p. 657, fn. 19.) With these principles in mind, the high court found defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance despite the fact that counsel was given only 25 days to prepare for trial, he was young and inexperienced in criminal matters, the charges were complex, and grave, and some witnesses were not easily accessible. The court held the defendant failed to show actual ineffectiveness. (Id. at p. 657.)