In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and distinguished between a verdict of acquittal and the imposition of a sentence. Noting that there are many situations "under which the defendant is unaware of the precise extent of his punishment for significant periods of time, or even life," the Court concluded that "the Double Jeopardy Clause does not provide the defendant with the right to know at any specific moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be." Id. at 346. The Court used as examples the possibility of revocation of probation or parole and the pendency of appeal of a guilty verdict. Id. These examples are not comparable to the cumulation of separate sentences after the defendant has already begun serving his sentence. Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly agreed that the examples it was using do not involve the increase of a final sentence, and while the defendant is aware at the original sentencing that a term of imprisonment later may be imposed, the situation before us is different in no critical respect. Respondent was similarly aware that a dangerous special offender sentence is subject to increase on appeal. His legitimate expectations are not defeated if his sentence is increased on appeal any more than are the expectations of the defendant who is placed on parole or probation that is later revoked. Id. at 346. The Supreme Court held that, even though DiFrancesco had completed serving the imposed sentence, double jeopardy was not violated because a federal statute gave the government the right to appeal; therefore, because the government still retained the right to appeal, the defendant could have no expectation of finality.