In United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004), the United States Supreme Court addressed the burden imposed on a defendant who complains that the trial court failed to engage in the colloquy required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 when accepting a plea agreement. See 542 U.S. at 81-82. The Court in that context directed that a defendant "must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' of the proceeding." Id. at 83. The United States Supreme Court considered the question whether, in order to show that a violation of Rule 11 constitutes reversible plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty if the violation had not occurred. The court held that a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed Rule 11 plain error, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea. Id. at 81-82. Specifically, a defendant "must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding." Id. Id. at 83. In footnote 9, the court held that "the reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different." 542 U.S. at 83. Justice Scalia expressly dissented to this on the grounds that creating a standard of proof different from "preponderance of the evidence" created subtle shades of proof that were impracticable to apply. Id. at 86. The reviewing court should consider "record evidence tending to show that a misunderstanding was inconsequential to a defendant's decision, or evidence indicating the relative significance of other facts that may have borne on his choice regardless of any Rule 11 error." Id. at 84 . The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, finding that, in deciding whether a defendant was prejudiced, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had employed a standard that improperly foreclosed consideration of such record evidence. Id. The proper inquiry would include "the overall strength of the Government's case and any possible defenses that appear from the record." Id. at 85. T he court further explained: "The point of the question is not to second-guess a defendant's actual decision; if it is reasonably probable he would have gone to trial absent the error, it is no matter that the choice may have been foolish. The point, rather, is to enquire whether the omitted warning would have made the difference required by the standard of reasonable probability . . . ."Id.