United States v. Dunnigan

In United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993), the United States Supreme Court modified the rule in Grayson to comport with Sentencing Guideline 3C1.1, which "states in full: 'If the defendant willfully impeded or obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense, increase the defendant's offense level by 2 levels.' U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 (Nov. 1989)." Because willful impediment or obstruction of justice is required under this guideline, "if a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement resulting from her trial testimony"; id. at 95; a federal sentencing judge is required to "review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to, or obstruction of, justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition . . . ." Id. The Supreme Court explained: "An accused may give inaccurate testimony due to confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. In other instances, an accused may testify to matters such as lack of capacity, insanity, duress, or self- defense. Her testimony may be truthful, but the jury may nonetheless find the testimony insufficient to excuse criminal liability or prove lack of intent. For these reasons, if a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement resulting from her trial testimony, a district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition we have set out. When doing so, it is preferable for a district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding. The district court's determination that enhancement is required is sufficient, however, if, as was the case here, the court makes a finding of an obstruction of, or impediment to, justice that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury. See App. 29 ('The court finds that the defendant was untruthful at trial with respect to material matters in this case. By virtue of her failure to give truthful testimony on material matters that were designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case, the court concludes that the false testimony at trial warrants an upward adjustment by two levels' ). Given the numerous witnesses who contradicted respondent regarding so many facts on which she could not have been mistaken, there is ample support for the District Court's finding." (Dunnigan, supra, 507 U.S. at pp. 95-96.)