In United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982), the defendant was charged with misdemeanors and petty offenses for speeding and assaulting an officer with his car. His trial was assigned to a magistrate, but he demanded a jury trial, which required a transfer to a district court. In the district court, the prosecutor obtained a felony indictment, and defendant was convicted of a felony and a misdemeanor. The defendant was initially charged with several misdemeanors and petty offenses under federal law. The defendant entered plea negotiations regarding these charges but later refused to plead guilty to the charges and requested a jury trial. Id. at 371. Approximately six weeks later, the prosecutor sought and received an indictment including one felony count arising out of the same facts which constituted the lesser offenses. Id. The jury convicted the defendant on the felony count and the defendant moved to set aside the verdict based on prosecutorial vindictiveness. Id. In declining to apply a presumption of vindictiveness or make a finding of it, the Court recognized that: 'Additional' charges obtained by a prosecutor could not necessarily be characterized as an impermissible 'penalty.' Since charges brought in an original indictment may be abandoned by the prosecutor in the course of plea negotiation--in often what is clearly a 'benefit' to the defendant--changes in the charging decision that occur in the context of plea negotiation are an inaccurate measure of improper prosecutorial 'vindictiveness.' An initial indictment--from which the prosecutor embarks on a course of plea negotiation--does not necessarily define the extent of the legitimate interest in prosecution. For just as a prosecutor may forego legitimate charges already brought in an effort to save the time and expense of trial, a prosecutor may file additional charges if an initial expectation that a defendant would plead guilty to lesser charges proves unfounded. 457 U.S. at 379-80, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 84 (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978). Also, the Court stated that "a change in the charging decision made after an initial trial is completed is much more likely to be improperly motivated than is a pre-trial decision." Id. at 381, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 85. The court held there was no presumption of vindictiveness, explaining that a prosecutor may forgo legitimate charges already brought in an effort to save the time and expense of trial, and may file additional charges if an initial expectation of a guilty plea to lesser charges proves unfounded. (See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) 434 U.S. 357 no vindictiveness where defendant, in plea negotiations, refused to plead guilty to the original charge, and the prosecutor then obtained an indictment on a more serious charge.) The court declined to apply an inflexible presumption of vindictiveness in this pretrial setting, explaining defense counsel routinely file various pretrial motions, and it is unrealistic to assume that a prosecutor's probable response to them will be to penalize the defendant and thus deter these motions. The prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise broad discretion, and an initial decision should not freeze future conduct. (Goodwin, supra, at pp. 381-382.) The Supreme Court held in Goodwin that no presumption of vindictiveness arises in the pretrial stage. The court stated that prior to trial the prosecutor has discretion to increase charges after the defendant exercises a legal right as long as the purpose was not solely to punish the defendant for exercising the right. As stated in Goodwin: There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting. In the course of preparing a case for trial, the prosecutor may uncover additional information that suggests a basis for further prosecution or he simply may come to realize that information possessed by the State has a broader significance. At this stage of the proceedings, the prosecutor's assessment of the proper extent of prosecution may not have crystallized. In contrast, once a trial begins-and certainly by the time a conviction has been obtained-it is much more likely that the State had discovered and assessed all of the information against an accused and has made a determination, on the basis of that information, of the extent to which he should be prosecuted. Thus, a change in the charging decision made after an initial trial is completed is much more likely to be improperly motivated than is a pretrial decision. 457 U.S. at 381, 102 S. Ct. at 2492-93, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 85. The Supreme Court of the United States considered whether a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness should arise when a prosecutor files additional or more serious charges against a defendant after the defendant refuses to plead guilty to lesser charges during plea negotiations. The Court contrasted such a situation from one in which a prosecutor adds additional charges after a defendant successfully appeals from a conviction, a situation from which a presumption of vindictiveness might arise because of the perception that the prosecutor was punishing the defendant for appealing his conviction. Id. at 374-380 (II). In a pre-trial, plea negotiation setting, however, the Court acknowledged that there is no element of punishment, "so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer." Id. at 378 (II). In that situation, additional charges obtained by a prosecutor could not necessarily be characterized as an impermissible "penalty." Since charges brought in an original indictment may be abandoned by the prosecutor in the course of plea negotiation - in often what is clearly a "benefit" to the defendant - changes in the charging decision that occur in the context of plea negotiation are an inaccurate measure of improper prosecutorial "vindictiveness." An initial indictment - from which the prosecutor embarks on a course of plea negotiation - does not necessarily define the extent of the legitimate interest in prosecution. For just as a prosecutor may forgo legitimate charges already brought in an effort to save the time and expense of trial, a prosecutor may file additional charges if an initial expectation that a defendant would plead guilty to lesser charges proves unfounded. . . . A prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise the broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal interest in prosecution. An initial decision should not freeze future conduct. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U. S. at 379-382 (II), (III). In United States v. Goodwin, the Supreme Court declined to apply a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting in which Goodwin was indicted on a felony charge after he requested a jury trial on a pending misdemeanor and petty offenses arising out of the same incident. The Supreme Court distinguished Blackledge v. Perry because it involved a post-trial setting: "A change in the charging decision made after an initial trial is completed is much more likely to be improperly motivated than is a pretrial decision." 457 U.S. at 381. This is so because the "institutional bias inherent in the judicial system against the retrial of issues that have already been decided," id. at 376, gives the prosecutor and the court a stake in avoiding having "to do over what it thought it had already done correctly." Id. at 383. Noting that "a mere opportunity for vindictiveness is insufficient to justify the imposition of a prophylactic rule," the Court held that "the possibility that a prosecutor would respond to a defendant's pretrial demand for a jury trial by bringing charges not in the public interest that could be explained only as a penalty imposed on the defendant is so unlikely that a presumption of vindictiveness is not warranted." Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384. The Supreme Court has held that "to punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort." Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372. Therefore, in certain cases in which the prosecution has taken actions against the defendant after the defendant exercised a protected statutory or constitutional right, the courts have presumed an improper vindictive motive which may warrant dismissal of the prosecution's charge. See 457 U.S. at 373. In Goodwin, an individual charged with several federal misdemeanor and petty offenses at first expressed a desire to engage in plea bargaining regarding these charges, but later refused to plead guilty to the charges and instead requested a jury trial. See 457 U.S. at 370. The prosecutor then sought and received an indictment including one felony count arising out of the same facts which constituted the lesser offenses. See id. The Court held that a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness is applicable where a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness" exists, but that the presumption was not warranted under the facts in Goodwin. 457 U.S. at 384. In addition, the Court held that a change in the prosecutor's charging decision made before trial is less likely to be improperly motivated than when such a decision is made after an initial trial. See 457 U.S. at 382. While Goodwin did not need to reach the issue, the Court noted that if a presumption applied, it could be overcome by objective evidence justifying the prosecutor's action. See 457 U.S. at 376 n.8.