In United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543, 91 S. Ct. 547 (1971), after the jury was empanelled, the government called five witnesses whom the defendant allegedly aided in preparing fraudulent tax returns. Defense counsel requested that the court advise the witnesses of their constitutional rights before testifying. The trial court informed the witnesses that anything they said during the trial could be used against them in a subsequent criminal trial. The witnesses acknowledged that they were aware of their rights and were previously warned of their rights by the IRS. "The trial judge indicated, however, that he did not believe the witnesses had been given any warning at the time they were first contacted by the IRS, and refused to permit them to testify until they had consulted an attorney." Jorn, 400 U.S. at 473. When the prosecutor attempted to explain to the trial court that he intended to prosecute the case in a manner that did not require the witnesses to incriminate themselves, the trial judge abruptly declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487. The United States Supreme Court held, it is apparent from the record that no consideration was given to the possibility of a trial continuance; indeed, the trial judge acted so abruptly in discharging the jury that, had the prosecutor been disposed to suggest a continuance, or the defendant to object to the discharge of the jury, there would have been no opportunity to do so. When one examines the circumstances surrounding the discharge of this jury, it seems abundantly apparent that the trial judge made no effort to exercise a sound discretion to assure that, taking all the circumstances into account, there was a manifest necessity for the sua sponte declaration of this mistrial. United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. at 580. Therefore we must conclude that in the circumstances of this case, appellee's reprosecution would violate the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487.