In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive pre-indictment delay. Proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim The due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. Id. at 790. The defendant established neither deliberate conduct nor negligence on the part of the prosecution, the court stated that it "could not determine in the abstract the circumstances in which preaccusation delay would require dismissing prosecutions." (Lovasco, supra, at p. 796.) In Lovasco, the court held that due process is not violated by an "investigative delay" in prosecution, even if the defendant is "somewhat prejudiced" by this delay. The court distinguished investigative delay from delay undertaken for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage, noting that an investigative delay is: "not so one sided. Rather than deviating from elementary standards of 'fair play and decency,' a prosecutor abides by them if he refuses to seek indictments until he is completely satisfied that he should prosecute and will be able promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Penalizing prosecutors who defer action for these reasons would subordinate the goal of 'orderly expedition' to that of 'mere speed." Id., quoting Smith v. United States (1959), 360 U.S. 1. The Supreme Court expressly refused to adopt a constitutional requirement that the state file charges immediately upon securing sufficient evidence to prove a person's guilt. The Court held that a court applying the Due Process Clause to preindictment delay has "to determine only whether the action complained of . . . violates those 'fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions' and which define 'the community's sense of fair play and decency.'" Id. at 790. The Court further noted: "From the perspective of law enforcement officials, a requirement of immediate prosecution upon probable cause is . . . unacceptable because it could make obtaining proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt impossible by causing potentially fruitful sources of information to evaporate before they are fully exploited." Id. at 792-93. And Lovasco makes clear that an investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay undertaken by the government solely to gain an improper tactical advantage over an accused; to prosecute a defendant following an investigative delay is not a deprivation of due process. Id. at 795-96.