United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), involved the search of a bedroom based upon consent of a woman who shared it with the defendant, the United States Supreme Court explained that the "common authority" over property which confers the power to consent to its search is founded "on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched." (Id. at p. 171, fn. 7.The United States Supreme Court considered the validity of a police search after obtaining consent from a third person. In Matlock, the respondent lived in a house with Gayle Graff and her children. Id. at 991. After the police arrested the respondent in the front yard of the house, they asked Graff for consent to search the house without asking the respondent. Graff voluntarily consented and the police seized evidence from a bedroom that the respondent and Graff shared. Id. The Court, in finding that the police conducted a valid search, stated that "the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared," and that consent may be shown by permission "obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." Id. at 993. The Supreme Court stated: "The consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared. . . . When the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." The Court, discussing Federal Rules of Evidence 104 and 1101, reversed decisions of the lower courts suppressing evidence obtained from a warrantless search. Id. Hearsay evidence was presented at the suppression hearing. Id. at 994. The Court stated "it should be recalled that the rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence." Id. at 994. Rules applicable to trials versus evidentiary rules applicable to other types of proceedings were distinguishable because the matters to be proved at these proceedings were different. Id.