In United States v. Scott (1978), 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, the United States Supreme Court held that jeopardy does not attach if the court "terminates the proceedings favorably to the defendant on a basis not related to factual guilt or innocence." Id. at 92. In particular, the court explained: "We now turn to the relationship between the Double Jeopardy Clause and reprosecution of a defendant who has successfully obtained not a mistrial but a termination of the trial in his favor before any determination of factual guilt or innocence. Unlike the typical mistrial, the granting of a motion such as this obviously contemplates that the proceedings will terminate then and there in favor of the defendant. The prosecution, if it wishes to reinstate the proceedings in the face of such a ruling, ordinarily must seek reversal of the decision of the trial court." Id. at 94. The Supreme Court summarized its position in Scott as follows: "We think that in a case such as this the defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is accused, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Rather, we conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice." Id. at 98-99. The Supreme Court of Ohio, relying on Scott, held in State v. Broughton (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 253, 581 N.E.2d 541, as follows: "Therefore, we hold that where jeopardy has attached during the course of a criminal proceeding, a dismissal of the case may be treated in the same manner as a declaration of a mistrial and will not bar a subsequent trial when: (1) the dismissal is based on a defense motion, and; (2) the court's decision in granting such motion is unrelated to a finding of factual guilt or innocence." Id. at 266.