United States v. Seeger

In United States v. Seeger (1965) 380 U.S. 163, the court concluded Congress intended that to qualify as a conscientious objector, a person needed only to "have a conviction based upon religious training and belief . . . ." ( United States v. Seeger, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 176.) The court construed that phrase as follows: "Within that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition." (Ibid.) The Supreme Court concluded, "This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well-established congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets." (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court recognized "the difficulties that have always faced the trier of fact in these cases." ( United States v. Seeger, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 183.) It described the proper test as "essentially objective" and described it as follows, "Namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?" ( Id. at p. 184 85 S.Ct. at p. 863.) The court further noted that the task before "local Selective Service boards and courts" is not to reject incomprehensible beliefs, but "to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious." ( Id. at pp. 184-185.) In Seeger, the court held that a potential draftee who could not definitively declare that he believed in a Supreme Being, but who strongly concluded, with the strength of a more traditional religious conviction, that killing in war was wrong, immoral, and unethical, qualified as a conscientious objector. The court stated: "In summary, Seeger professed 'religious belief' and 'religious faith.' He did not disavow any belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being'; indeed he stated that 'the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence.' He decried the tremendous 'spiritual' price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life. In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity with which he held them, we think the Board, had it applied the test we propose today, would have granted him the exemption. We think it clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity hold in the lives of his friends, the Quakers." ( United States v. Seeger, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 187.)