In Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, (1994), the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutional adequacy of an earlier definition of reasonable doubt then in use in California. That instruction defined "reasonable doubt" as follows: "'It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.'" (Id. at p. 7.) In Victor, the defendant contended in part that use of the phrase "to a moral certainty" violated the due process clause of the United States Constitution. The court noted that the question before it was whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the instruction allowed for a conviction based on proof that did not meet the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Victor, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 6.) While observing that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is "an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system" (id. at p. 5), the court recognized that it is a standard that "defies easy explication" (ibid.). Ultimately, the court decided that "although ... moral certainty is ambiguous in the abstract" the balance of the instruction gave content to the phrase because the jurors were told that they had to have an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. (Id. at p. 14.) The court held that "an instruction cast in terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, correctly states the government's burden of proof." (Id. at pp. 14-15) The United States Supreme Court held that an instruction cast in terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral certainty, would correctly state the government's burden of proof, noting that the definitions of reasonable doubt most widely used in the federal courts do not contain any reference to moral certainty. 511 U.S. at 18-28. The Victor Court agreed with the petitioner's argument that "moral certainty" has "lost its historical meaning" and considered that the phrase "might not be recognized by modern jurors as a synonym for 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 511 U.S. at 13-14. While not holding that use of the term "moral certainty" in the full context of the instruction lowered the standard of proof from that which due process requires, the Court also stated that "we do not condone the use of the phrase." 511 U.S. at 16. The Supreme Court upheld this version of CALJIC No. 2.90, but criticized as archaic the instruction's use of the phrase "moral certainty." "We do not think it reasonably likely that the jury understood the words 'moral certainty' either as suggesting a standard of proof lower than due process requires or as allowing conviction on factors other than the government's proof. At the same time, however, we do not condone the use of the phrase. As modern dictionary definitions of moral certainty attest, the common meaning of the phrase has changed since it was used in the Webster instruction, and it may continue to do so to the point that it conflicts with the Winship standard. Indeed, the definitions of reasonable doubt most widely used in the federal courts do not contain any reference to moral certainty." (Victor v. Nebraska, supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 16-17.) In Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, the United States Supreme Court held that "the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt , the Constitution does not require that any particular form or words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. Rather, 'taken as a whole, the instructions must correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.' " (Id. at p. 5.) Victor v. Nebraska confirms that instructing a jury with CALJIC No. 2.90 does not violate the Constitution.