Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation

In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the United States Supreme Court considered an equal-protection challenge to a zoning decision that resulted in the exclusion of low-income housing designed to serve minorities from the Village of Arlington Heights. The Court stated that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination." Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 429 U.S. at 264-65. According to Arlington Heights, determining whether the requisite discriminatory purpose exists "demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. Disproportionate impact is one piece of evidence. Id. Other factors the Court identified include the historical background providing the context for the challenged action, the specific sequence of events leading up to it, departures from the normal procedural and substantive course, and legislative or administrative history. Id. at 267-68. The Supreme Court discussed the type of proof required to establish an Equal Protection violation. To show an Equal Protection violation, proof of racially discriminatory intent is required. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. The Court noted that "determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Id. at 266. For example, "an important starting point" may be the official action's impact and "whether it 'bears more heavily on one race than another.'" Id. And if impact alone is not determinative, the court may look to other evidence, such as the decision's historical background, the sequence of events leading up to the action, departures from procedural and substantive norms, and legislative history, including decisionmakers' contemporaneous statements, meeting minutes, and reports. Id. at 266-68. But only in "extraordinary instances" may legislative members be called to testify concerning the official action's purpose, and "even then such testimony frequently will be barred by privilege." Id. at 268. That is because judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of government. Placing a decisionmaker on the stand is therefore "usually to be avoided." Id. at 268 n.18