In Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Ed. (1985) 471 U.S. 234, the federal district court decided that an African American schoolteacher, who prevailed in his section 1983 action (42 U.S.C. 1983) challenging termination of his employment, was not entitled to attorney fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 for time spent by counsel in pursuing optional administrative remedies before the local school board, although the teacher contended he was entitled to fees on the basis that time spent by counsel in the school board proceedings was reasonably expended in preparation for the successful court action. The Supreme Court affirmed. Noting that the federal statute authorizing fees (42 U.S.C. 1988) only authorized fees in an "action or proceeding to enforce section 1983," and gave the trial court discretion whether to award fees to a prevailing party, the court observed that "administrative proceedings established to enforce tenure rights created by state law simply are not any part of the proceedings to enforce 1983, and even though the petitioner obtained relief from his dismissal in the later civil rights action, he is not automatically entitled to claim attorney's fees for time spent in the administrative process . . . ." ( Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Ed., supra, at p. 241 105 S. Ct. at p. 1927, ) Emphasizing that, as held in Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424 the amount to be awarded necessarily depends "on the facts of each case" ( id. at p. 429 103 S. Ct. at p. 1937), and that "the exercise of discretion by the district court must be respected" ( Webb, at p. 242 105 S. Ct. at p. 1928), the court reiterated that "the 'most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.' " (Ibid.)