In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp. (1998) 525 U.S. 70, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question whether a general arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement required an employee to use the arbitration procedures for an alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. 1210 et seq.). (Id. at p. 72.) The collective bargaining agreement governing the employee's employment provided that it was intended to cover all matters "affecting wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" and stated that all unresolved disputes were subject to arbitration. (Id. at pp. 72-73.) The employee was also subject to a seniority plan which contained its own grievance procedures and specified that any dispute "arising out of the terms and/or conditions" of the agreement, including the "interpretation or application" of the agreement, was subject to the grievance procedures. (Id. at p. 73.) The employee filed suit under the ADA when he learned stevedoring companies would not hire him because he had previously settled a claim for permanent disability. (Id. at pp. 74-75.) The district court dismissed the case because the employee had failed to pursue the grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement and the seniority plan. The Fourth Circuit affirmed and the United States Supreme Court reversed. The Wright court noted that in the context of collective bargaining agreements there is generally a presumption of arbitrability of issues that are arguably within the scope of the agreement. The presumption, the court explained, "does not extend beyond the reach of the principle rationale that justifies it, which is that arbitrators are in a better position than courts to interpret the terms of a CBA collective bargaining agreement." (Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., supra, 525 U.S. at p. 78.) The court stated that the discrimination claim under the ADA concerned neither the application nor interpretation of the agreement, but the meaning of a federal statute, and was thus "distinct from any right conferred by the agreement." (Id. at p. 79.) Because the case involved the interpretation and application of a statute, "the ultimate question for the arbitrator would be not what the parties have agreed to, but what federal law requires." (Ibid.) Accordingly, for an agreement to require arbitration of a statutory claim the Court held it must be "clear and unmistakable" that the parties intended to waive a judicial forum for statutory claims. The waiver must be "explicitly stated" (id. at p. 80) because "the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient importance to be protected against less-than-explicit union waiver in a CBA collective bargaining agreement." (Ibid.) The arbitration provision under review did not meet this "clear and unmistakable" standard. The arbitration clause was very general and failed to include an "explicit incorporation of statutory antidiscrimination requirements." (Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., supra, 525 U.S. at p. 80.) Accordingly, the Court held that the agreement had not waived the covered employee's right to a judicial forum for his federal statutory claims of discrimination. (Id. at p. 82.)