In Stubblefield v. Trombino, 197 Ariz. 382, 4 P.3d 437 (App. 2000) the Court held that 13-901.01 applies to attempted possession of narcotic drugs as a lesser-included offense of possession of drugs and that probation for offenders convicted of attempted possession is mandated by subsection (A). In Stubblefield, the state argued that "the plain language of A.R.S. 13-901. 01 does not include preparatory offenses such as attempt." 197 Ariz. 382 at P4, 4 P.3d 437, P4. However, the court found that, because Proposition 200 was enacted to ensure drug treatment and drug education for offenders, "it would be illogical to hold that Proposition 200 applies to possession of narcotic drugs but that it does not apply to the less serious offense of attempted possession of narcotic drugs." 197 Ariz. 382 at P6; 4 P.3d 437 at P6. Pursuant to State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, 158 P.3d 263 (App. 2007), the determination of whether a prior conviction was a violent crime was limited to the elements of the offense and that aggravated assault on a peace officer was not necessarily a violent crime as contemplated by A.R.S. 13-901.01 and 13-901.03 because it could be committed without using a weapon or causing physical injury. In State v. Joyner, this court concluded that the determination whether a previous conviction constituted a violent crime under 13-901.01 should be based on the elements of that offense and that consideration of the offense's underlying facts generally is improper. 215 Ariz. 134,14-15, 158 P.3d at 268-69. The purpose of this rule, as explained in Joyner, is to protect a defendant's due process rights and to avoid "'what is, in effect, a second trial on a defendant's prior conviction to establish the existence' of a sentencing factor." Id.12, 15.