In Champlin v. Sargeant, 192 Ariz. 371, P15, 965 P.2d 763, P15 (1998), Shelley, an adult who might have witnessed the defendant's sexual conduct with a minor, was identified in that same incident as a victim of the crime of public sexual indecency. 192 Ariz. 371, P22, 965 P.2d 763, P22. The statute relating to the latter offense, A.R.S. 13-1403, essentially mirrors the indecent exposure statute, 13-1402, in that both require: (a) conduct in another person's presence and; (b) a defendant's recklessness "about whether such other person, as a reasonable person, would be offended or alarmed by the act." See Whitaker, 164 Ariz. at 361, 793 P.2d at 118. Although Champlin did not squarely address the issue presented here, our supreme court concluded that the defendant was "not entitled to interview Shelley regarding conduct Shelley may have witnessed" against the minor because she was a "victim of the same conduct." 192 Ariz. 371, P22, 965 P.2d 763, P22.