The Confrontation Clause provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. See also: State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, 315,61, 160 P.3d 177, 194 (2007). statements by a witness who does not appear at trial In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court held that a "testimonial" statement by a witness who does not appear at trial must be excluded under the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The Court did not comprehensively define "testimonial," but described a "core class of 'testimonial' statements" as including affidavits, custodial examinations, depositions, prior testimony, confessions, "statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations," and any other "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Id. at 51-52. In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006), the Supreme Court analyzed whether statements made to a 911 operator were "testimonial" for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. There the Court held that "statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." Id. at 822. On the other hand, statements "are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Id. Thus, in Davis the Supreme Court shifted the focus under the Confrontation Clause to the "primary purpose" of an interrogation. See State v. Alvarez, 213 Ariz. 467, 471,15, 143 P.3d 668, 672 (App. 2006). the Court observed that "a 911 call is ordinarily not designed primarily to 'establish or prove' some past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance." Davis, 547 U.S. at 827; see also id. ("the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had happened in the past"). Michigan v. Bryant, the Court sought to clarify the "primary purpose" analysis. 562 U.S. 344, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011). the Court held the determination requires an objective evaluation of the facts relating to the exchange: An objective analysis of the circumstances of an encounter and the statements and actions of the parties to it provides the most accurate assessment of the "primary purpose of the interrogation." The circumstances in which an encounter occurs -- e.g., at or near the scene of the crime versus at a police station, during an ongoing emergency or afterwards -- are clearly matters of objective fact. the statements and actions of the parties must also be objectively evaluated. That is, the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals' statements and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred. Id. at 109, 131 S. Ct. at 1156.