In State v. McKinney, 185 Ariz. 567, 582-83, 917 P.2d 1214, 1229-30 (1996), the court noted that although the defendant's "prior conviction for second-degree murder was for a crime that, on the face of the statute, might have been committed recklessly" and so could not be used as an aggravating factor under former 13-703(F)(2), the jury instructions or forms of verdict might have been used to "narrow the . . . charge" found in the statutory definition, 185 Ariz. at 583, 917 P.2d at 1230. As the court explained: Defendant's prior conviction is not disqualified merely because the statutory definition of the crime permits it to be committed with a reckless mental state. It is disqualified because the instructions and the non-specific form of verdict . . . did not narrow the mental state of the charge . . . . Had defendant's instructions or form of verdict specified that the mental state for his second degree murder conviction was based on either an intentional or knowing mens rea, the conviction would have qualified, regardless of the fact that the crime's statutory definition allows for conviction under a lesser mental state. Id.