In Young v. DFW Corp., 184 Ariz. 187, 908 P.2d 1 (App. 1995), the legislature enacted a statute that required a plaintiff to establish more than general negligence to prove dram shop liability. Id. at 188, 908 P.2d at 2. In holding that the statute is unconstitutional, this Court explained that the statute did "not merely 'regulate the mode, method, and procedure to be followed in pursuing the cause of action . . . but completely deprived many who have sustained real injury of judicial remedy.'" Id. at 190, 908 P.2d at 4. The Court held that a statute that required a plaintiff to establish more than general negligence to prove dram shop liability was unconstitutional because "the statute did 'not merely "regulate the mode, method, and procedure to be followed in pursuing the cause of action . . . but completely deprived many who have sustained real injury of a judicial remedy."'" Id. The Court distinguished the equine owner immunity statute at issue in Lindsay v. Cave Creek Outfitters, L.L.C from the dram shop statute in Young on the basis that, in Young, the statute denied all plaintiffs alleging dram shop liability the right to proceed under ordinary negligence principles, whereas the equine owner immunity statute did not deny all riders or renters the right to sue for ordinary negligence but rather denied ordinary negligence claims to those who elected to sign a release and met the other criteria in the statute. Id. at 493-94, P 24, 88 P.3d at 563-64.