Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal

In Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, the Supreme Court rejected an assertion by employers that exhaustion of their administrative remedies before the California Employment Commission would be futile since the commission had already decided cases involving facts similar to those in Abelleira and the commission's decisions in those cases were against the position taken by the employers in Abelleira. The court said that to accept such an assertion "would break down the rule of exhaustion of remedies. In substance the contention is that if they learn upon hearsay or by analogy that the administrative board may take a certain action, the board may be ignored and its action treated as already taken. We should all be very much surprised, no doubt, to find such an assertion made in the judicial field. One might attempt, for example to bring an original suit in the Supreme Court on the theory that the local superior court judge was possessed of a particular opinion opposed to the views of the plaintiff, but he would receive scant consideration. The whole argument rests upon an illogical and impractical basis, since it permits the party applying to the court to assert without any conclusive proof, and without any possibility of successful challenge, the outcome of an appeal which the administrative body has not even been permitted to decide. . . . It should be observed also that this argument is completely answered by those cases which apply the rule of exhaustion of remedies to rehearings. Since the board has already made a decision, if the argument of futility of further application were sound, then surely this is the instance in which it would be accepted. But it has been held that where the administrative procedure provides a rehearing, the rule of exhaustion of remedies will apply in order that the board may be given an opportunity to correct any errors that it may have made. " ( Id. at pp. 301-302.) In Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, a referee had determined that the employees were eligible for benefits, and the employers, contending the employees were actually on strike and ineligible, had obtained a temporary restraining order from the Court of Appeal, withholding payment of the benefits. The Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition against the Court of Appeal. Rejecting the employer's claim of irreparable injury, the Supreme Court cited the predecessor of section 1335 and concluded, "The very essence of the act is its provision for the prompt payment of benefits to those unemployed. Any substantial delay would defeat this purpose and would bring back the very evil sought to be avoided . . . . . . . . The legislature has concluded that it is wiser to have a system of unemployment compensation operating with a possible small percentage of error, than to have a system not operating at all." ( Id., 17 Cal.2d at pp. 298, 300.) The California Supreme Court distinguished between a court's lack of "jurisdiction" in its "fundamental sense" and a court's lack of "jurisdiction" in its "ordinary" and "broader" sense. (Abelleira at pp. 288-289.) "Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties." (Abelleira at p. 288.) "But in its ordinary usage the phrase 'lack of jurisdiction' is not limited to these fundamental situations. For the purpose of determining the right to review by certiorari, restraint by prohibition, or dismissal of an action, a much broader meaning is recognized. Here it may be applied to a case where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no 'jurisdiction' (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites. . . . For example, after reversal of a judgment with directions to the lower court, it has jurisdiction to enter judgment, but is limited by the directions of the appellate court and is without jurisdiction to permit amended pleadings to raise new issues; hence prohibition will lie to prevent it from retrying the case." (Abelleira at pp. 288-290.)