In Agovino v. Kunze (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 591, a defendant's joint liability was predicated on his participation in a drag race with a third party, Gary Miner, even though the defendant's vehicle did not contact the car in which the plaintiff was a passenger. (Id. at p. 593.) The appellate court reversed a nonsuit granted at the close of the plaintiff's case, stating "it was for the jury to determine the manner of defendant's driving and whether the same was done in concert with Gary Miner. The evidence, both direct and circumstantial, is substantial and if believed by the jury is more than sufficient to prove that, both immediately before and at the time of the collision, defendant was racing his vehicle with the car involved in the collision in violation of Vehicle Code section 601.5 (Veh. Code, former 23109), thus establishing a prima facie case of negligence as a matter of law. That section provides that '(N)o person shall engage in any motor vehicle speed contest or exhibition of speed on a highway and no person shall aid or abet in any such motor vehicle speed contest or exhibition on any highway.' Factually, the record at this stage of the trial contains sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant was engaged in and aided and abetted in an unlawful speed contest with Gary Miner, along Laurel Grove Avenue through the Erwin Street intersection, at the time of the collision between the Parker and Miner cars. Defendant was familiar with the neighborhood--he knew that the two streets intersected at a point surrounded by the activity of residents who lived in the area, and adults and children who frequented the nearby park; and that Laurel Grove Avenue along which he raced his car was intersected by various residential cross streets, and had located thereon Victory-Van Owen Park in which children played and picnicked." (Id. at pp. 596-597.) The appellate court also determined there was enough evidence of proximate cause to submit the case to the jury: "Whether the two boys, in so many words agreed to race, or from their conduct a tacit mutual understanding of such an agreement may be inferred, the collision with Gary Miner's car nevertheless occurred during the time they were engaged in racing each other. The fact that defendant's automobile did not actually come into contact with the plaintiff's car is of little importance on the issue of proximate cause." (Id. at pp. 597-598.) The court analogized the circumstances to a criminal manslaughter case stemming from two codefendants racing separate cars in which one defendant killed the plaintiff and the other moved on; there, the evidence was "'sufficient to show that the defendants were not acting independently of each other, and that they were jointly engaged in a series of acts which led directly to the collision.'" (Id. at p. 597.)