In Anderson v. City of La Mesa (1981) 118 Cal. App. 3d 657, respondent City of La Mesa issued a building permit to petitioner Anderson to build a house under La Mesa's standard zoning ordinances. These ordinances required a five-foot side yard setback. Anderson built her house seven feet from the lot line on one side in compliance with the five-foot ordinance. Despite numerous inspections during the course of construction, no objection to the location of the house was voiced by La Mesa officials until Anderson sought a final inspection after completion of the house when La Mesa contended that a special ordinance required a ten foot side yard setback. La Mesa refused to issue a certificate of occupancy and refused to grant a variance unless Anderson revised her house to comply with the ten-foot setback requirement. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's issuance of a writ of mandate requiring La Mesa to issue a certificate of occupancy finding that La Mesa was estopped to enforce the 10-foot side yard setback. Anderson presents a classic case of estoppel. La Mesa made a representation in its building permit that a five-foot side yard setback was required and Anderson relied on the representation in constructing her house. Because " 'the injustice which would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel,' " La Mesa was estopped from enforcing the 10-foot setback. ( Anderson v. City of La Mesa, supra, 118 Cal. App. 3d at p. 661.) In sum, a city denied a homeowner a zoning variance, and the homeowner sought mandamus under section 1094.5, which was granted. (Id. at pp. 659-660.) The court in Anderson affirmed. (Id. at p. 661.) In so ruling, it tersely stated that although the homeowner had not supplied the full administrative record to the superior court, the city had admitted most of the significant facts before the superior court, and thus the superior court had adequate evidence before it to rule upon the homeowner's petition. (Id. at p. 660.)