In Andre v. City of West Sacramento (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 532, an inverse condemnation case, the court reversed the order awarding attorney's fees because the plaintiff had not introduced any evidence demonstrating the amount of attorney's fees actually incurred, the ceiling to any fees award, and remanded to the trial court to determine whether the plaintiff had actually incurred any attorney's fees. (Id., at pp. 537-539.) The plaintiff in Andre argued that the fees she sought were reasonable and necessary and that her contingency fee agreement did not have to be disclosed. (Id., at p. 534.) The Third District noted that section 1036 authorized reimbursement of attorney fees "actually incurred" and reversed the award there because the plaintiff had introduced no evidence regarding the terms of her contingency fee agreement. The court in Andre rejected the plaintiff's reliance on Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (1985) by observing that the references there to the contingency fee agreement as not being determinative must be viewed in the context of the case. (Andre, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 537.) "In Salton Bay Marina, the plaintiff was obligated under the terms of its contingency fee agreement for approximately $ 4 million in attorney fees. The question before the court was whether this amount, which was 'actually incurred,' should be awarded, or whether the court should also consider various factors and determine whether such an award was reasonable." (Ibid.) "The import of Salton Bay Marina is clear. To receive an award of fees under section 1036, the court must first determine what fees were actually incurred. It must then assess whether these fees are reasonable. In other words, the fees actually incurred are a ceiling to any fee award; fees may be reduced because they are unreasonable and pose an unnecessary burden on public funds, but they cannot be increased beyond what was 'actually incurred.' " (Andre, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 537.)