Armstrong v. Picquelle

In Armstrong v. Picquelle (l984) 157 Cal. App. 3d 122, the trial court issued tentative findings in its minutes. One of the parties requested findings of fact and conclusions of law (a statement of decision) and the court directed its preparation. After the trial judge retired, a proposed statement of decision was filed, and another party filed proposed counterfindings of fact. (Id. at pp. 125-126.) The presiding judge then "signed settled findings of fact and conclusions of law, presumably conformable to the trial judge's statement of tentative findings," and also signed a judgment. (Id. at p.126.) The reviewing court reversed the judgment, holding that section 635 "authorizes the signing of a formal judgment by the presiding judge only where (1) no statement of decision has been requested or (2) the judge who has heard the evidence has already provided the parties with a statement of decision upon their request for it. The statute does not . . . authorize the presiding judge to enter a formal judgment whenever the judge who has heard the evidence has orally entered a tentative decision, or tentative findings . . . in the minutes." (Id. at p. 127.) In explaining its holding, the Armstrong court stated that if section 635 were interpreted "to allow a presiding judge to enter judgment on the basis of a tentative decision entered in the minutes, that would strip the parties of their Code of Civil Procedure section 632 right to a statement of decision after the trial judge's tentative ruling. The Legislature could not have intended to take away with one hand what it gave with the other.. . . To allow entry of a judgment by a presiding judge on the basis of a tentative ruling by a nonavailable trial judge would wrest from the parties the right to have 'the judge who hears the evidence . . . decide the case' , depriving them of their right to a full and fair trial." (Id. at pp. 127-128.) The court went on to observe that California Rules of Court, rule 232, provides that a court's tentative decision does not constitute a judgment, and is not binding on the trial court. Moreover, said the court, under no reading of section 635 "did the presiding judge have the authority to sign his own findings of fact and conclusions of law on the basis of a partial transcript of the trial, what appeared in the minutes and the parties' respective proposed findings. Such a procedure would deprive the parties of their right to a statement of decision from the judge who had heard the evidence." (Id. at p. 128.) The Armstrong court ruled that given the trial judge's unavailability, a new trial was required. (Ibid.)