In Baharian-Mehr v. Smith (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 265, the defendant "filed a special motion to strike certain causes of action . . . , arguing that they arose from the constitutionally protected activity." (Id. at p. 270.) "The court denied the motion, finding that 'the gravamen of this case is a business dispute between owners and not activity protected by . . . the anti-SLAPP statute.' The court also found that the motion to strike was frivolous, 'in that there was no reasonable basis for the moving party to assert that . . . the gravamen of this case arose from protected activity . . . .' The court therefore ordered defendant Smith to pay $1,500 in attorney fees to Baharian-Mehr." (Ibid.) Section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), provides in part: "If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5." Subdivision (a) of section 128.5 states in part: "A trial court may order a party, the party's attorney, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay." In this case, the trial court relied upon a different portion of section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), generally establishing that "a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs." In Baharian-Mehr, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th 265, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, agreed "with the holding in Doe that a separate attorney fee order should not be heard on interlocutory appeal . . . ." (Id. at p. 274.) The appellate court concluded, however, that where "the issue of whether the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted is properly before the appellate court" pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (i), a court of appeal has jurisdiction to review both the lower court's ruling granting the defendant's special motion to strike and a contemporaneous award of attorney fees and costs under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). (Baharian-Mehr, supra, at. 275.) The court reasoned: "In Moore v. Shaw (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, the defendants appealed the denial of their anti-SLAPP motion, and the plaintiff cross-appealed the denial of his request for attorney fees. (Id. at p. 186.) The appellate court affirmed the denial of the motion and reversed the trial court's decision not to award fees, finding the request should have been granted. The appeal of the attorney fee award was part and parcel of the appeal on the anti-SLAPP motion itself. Not only was the decision part of the same order, but evaluating the trial court's decision on the attorney fee motion required a thorough review of the merits of the motion. Addressing the merits of the motion at an early stage of the case while leaving the attorney fee issue for some date far in the future artificially separates two intertwined issues. Further, it potentially constitutes a waste of judicial resources, if, at that far later date, the only issue left to be decided is attorney fees on the long-ago anti-SLAPP motion." (Baharian-Mehr, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 274.) It concluded: "In cases where, as here, the issue of whether the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted is properly before the appellate court, it would be absurd to defer the issue of attorney fees until a future date, resulting in the probable waste of judicial resources. When the first issue is properly raised, appellate jurisdiction over both issues under section 425.16, subdivision (i) is proper." (Id. at p. 275.)