In Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 633, the plaintiff appealed after the trial court entered judgment of nonsuit in favor of the manufacturer of a punch press machine on which plaintiff was injured during the course of her employment. The press contained a lift safety gate which covered the operating area of the press when it was fully closed. The first owner of the press added an additional safety feature, an electric limit switch which activated the press when triggered by the closing of the safety gate. (Balido, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 638.) However, the press still did not meet California industrial safety standards. The plaintiff's employer purchased the press from its first owner in that condition. Thereafter, the manufacturer of the press contacted plaintiff's employer on several occasions, offering for sale additional safety equipment which would bring the press into compliance with the law, but the employer did not install any other safety devices. Plaintiff lost several fingers when the press was accidentally activated as she reached in to adjust the press plates. The manufacturer conceded at trial that the safety devices on the press were inadequate and ineffective, but argued that the press owner's disregard of its safety warnings was a superseding cause of the injury that legally relieved the manufacturer from liability for its defective design of the press. (Id. at p. 644.) The trial court agreed and granted nonsuit in favor of the manufacturer, finding that the employer's knowing disregard of the industrial safety order introduced an unforeseeable element that amounted to a legally superseding cause of the accident; the manufacturer's defective design ceased to be a proximate cause. (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed the grant of nonsuit, holding that the trial court erred in granting nonsuit because the determination of whether the press owner's disregard of the manufacturer's safety warnings was a superseding cause of the injury that legally relieved the manufacturer from liability could not be decided as a matter of law. Rather, it was a question of fact, to be decided by a trier of fact. (Id. at pp. 645, 647-648.) In discussing the circumstances under which responsibility is shifted from one wrongdoer to another, the appellate court quoted the Restatement Second Torts, section 452(2), comment f, as follows: "'It is apparently impossible to state any comprehensive rule as to when such a decision shift of duty will be made. Various factors will enter into it. Among them are the degree of danger and the magnitude of the risk of harm, the character and position of the third person who is to take the responsibility, his knowledge of the danger and the likelihood that he will or will not exercise proper care, his relation to the plaintiff or to the defendant, the lapse of time, and perhaps other considerations. The most that can be stated here is that when, by reason of the interplay of such factors, the court finds that full responsibility for control of the situation and prevention of the threatened harm has passed to the third person, his failure to act is then a superseding cause, which will relieve the original actor of liability.'" (Id. at p. 645.) In weighing these factors, "the extent to which designers and manufacturers of dangerous machinery are required to anticipate safety neglect presents an issue of fact." (Ibid.) Because a trier of fact might have concluded that the manufacturer had not done everything reasonably within its power to prevent injury to the plaintiff, the court reversed the judgment of nonsuit in favor of the manufacturer. (Id. at p. 649.)