In Bellante v. Superior Court (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, however, the appellate division of the Kern County Superior Court held that a presumptively prejudicial delay did not trigger an obligation by the trial court to apply the Barker factors, but instead triggered an obligation by the prosecution to justify the delay. In the absence of such justification, the complaint must be dismissed and the Barker v. Wingo (1972) analysis is inapplicable, the court believed. (Bellante, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th Supp. at pp. 4-7.) The court expressly rejected the opposite conclusion as reached by the appellate division of the Los Angeles Superior Court in People v. Alvarado (1997). (Bellante, supra, at pp. 6-7.) The Bellante court also quoted People v. Lowe (2007) 40 Cal.4th 937, in which the California Supreme Court said: "'The defense has the initial burden of showing prejudice from a delay in bringing the defendant to trial. Once the defense satisfies this burden, the prosecution must show justification for the delay.'" (Bellante, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 7.)