In Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, certain Los Angeles County taxpayers brought an action against the county and its sheriff, marshal, and deputy sheriff, and the constable of the Malibu Justice Court, seeking an injunction to restrain the defendants from executing the provisions of the claim and delivery law. (Blair, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 265.) Under the claim and delivery law in effect at the time of the lawsuit, a plaintiff in an action to recover the possession of personal property could, any time before the defendant filed an answer to the plaintiff's complaint, require the sheriff, constable or marshal or the county to take the property at issue from the defendant. (Ibid.) The Blair plaintiffs set forth four causes of action, two of which survived demurrer. Those causes of action alleged that (1) the claim and delivery law violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 19 of the California Constitution because it purported to authorize the entry into and search of private premises and the seizure of personal property without the issuance of a warrant upon probable cause; and (2) the law violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution insofar as it authorized such entry and seizure without timely notice and an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the claim. (Blair, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 265-266, fn. 3.) The plaintiffs contended that because the claim and delivery law was unconstitutional, the county officials were illegally expending county funds "by expending the time of county officials in executing its provisions." (Id. at p. 265.) The California Supreme Court discussed the frequent use of Code of Civil Procedure section 526a to provide a remedy for taxpayers seeking to prevent illegal expenditure of tax funds or other illegal conduct by governmental officials. Noting that the section "authorizes actions by a resident taxpayer against officers of a county, town, city, or city and county to obtain an injunction restraining and preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds" ( Id. at p. 267), the court declared that "the primary purpose of this statute, originally enacted in 1909, is to 'enable a large body of the citizenry to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged in the courts because of the standing requirement.'" ( Id. at pp. 267-268.) In the ensuing discussion, the Blair court emphasizes the remedial nature of section 526a, the necessity for liberally interpreting its scope, and its utility in preventing illegal conduct by the government involved.