Bledstein v. Superior Court

In Bledstein v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 152, the plaintiff was imprisoned for approximately four years, and thereafter initiated a legal malpractice action against the attorney who defended him in the underlying criminal action. (Id. at p. 155.) Before the trial court, the attorney asserted that the action was untimely under the one-year limitations period of section 340.6. (Bledstein, at pp. 155-156.) The trial court rejected the contention, reasoning that the limitations period was tolled under former section 352, subdivision (a)(3), which provided for tolling while a party was incarcerated on criminal charges. In affirming, the appellate court determined that the tolling provisions in section 340.6 describe the exclusive circumstances under which the limitation periods in the section are tolled. (Bledstein, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 162.) The court nonetheless concluded that the Legislature, in enacting the fourth tolling provision, intended to incorporate within its scope the general tolling provisions located in a portion of the Code of Civil Procedure (pt. 2, tit. 2, ch. 4), including section 351 and former section 352. (Bledstein, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 162.) As the court noted, the general provisions concern legal and physical impediments to a plaintiff's ability to institute a suit, such as absence of the defendant from California ( 351), minority and insanity ( 352, subd. (a)), the existence of a state of war ( 354), and the existence of a prohibitive injunction ( 356). (Bledstein, at pp. 161-162.) The court reasoned that the broad terms of the fourth tolling provision encompass the circumstances described in the general tolling provisions. (Id. at p. 162.) The court found additional support for its conclusion in the legislative history of section 340.6, which establishes that the drafters of the fourth tolling provision crafted its language to preserve the application of section 351 and the related tolling provisions. 6 (Bledstein, at pp. 164-166.)