In Blonde v. Estate of Jenkins (1955) 131 Cal. App. 2d 682, two women (appellant and respondent) claimed ownership of 250 shares of stock in an electric company as a gift from Will A. Jenkins. Appellant had been Jenkins's secretary. On about December 1, 1952, appellant visited Jenkins at his home. While there, Jenkins took some papers from a closet, stated he was giving her the electric company stock, entered her name and the number of the shares on the reverse side of each certificate, signed them, handed them to appellant, and then stated it was necessary to have his name guaranteed. Jenkins took back the certificates and stated that the next time he was at the bank, he would have that done. Respondent was Jenkins's housekeeper for 23 years. On December 22, 1952, Jenkins summoned her into the den. Jenkins stated that he had a gift of stock for respondent, but he could not give them to her. Jenkins stated he was going to have another person take the certificates to the bank and have them transferred to her name. The third person, at Jenkins's direction, orchestrated the delivery of the certificates to the bank. The bank forwarded the certificates to a transfer agent, who transferred them to respondent. Blonde rejected appellant's argument that there had been a valid gift of the certificates to her. Blonde affirmed the trial court's finding that the stock had been gifted to respondent. Blonde initially noted that "gifts first asserted after the death of the alleged donor are always regarded with suspicion by the courts. Because of the facility with which, after a donor is dead, a fraudulent claim of ownership may be founded on a pretended gift, assertedly made while the donor was living, it is but a salutary precaution which requires explicit and convincing evidence of every element that constitutes a valid gift inter vivos. " (Id. at p. 685.) Blonde reasoned as follows: "In order to make a valid gift, a donor must not only make delivery and part with control of the object claimed, but the donor must at the same time have the intention to complete a presently effective gift and a delivery amounting to a present transfer of title. . . .Appellant contends that after the certificates were delivered to her, she returned them to Mr. Jenkins for safekeeping. In other words, she revested in him all that he had delivered to her. The certificates were restored to the same pigeonhole, drawer or strongbox that had hitherto retained them. They never left the custody of the owner on December 1, 1952. All that passed between Mr. Jenkins and appellant were words. He had, after the conversation, all he had ever had. If he talked about giving the stock, he still retained possession and dominion over it after she had gone. To constitute a valid gift inter vivos, the gift must be complete by actual delivery without power of revocation. If dominion and control over the gift is retained by the donor until his death, it becomes merely an unexecuted and unenforceable promise to make a future gift. Reserving dominion and control over property is fatal to the asserted gift thereof. To accomplish a gift inter vivos, the donor must divest himself completely of the power of revocation. " (Id. at pp. 685-686.)