In Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London (2005) 36 Cal.4th 495, a disabled insured brought suit against his disability insurer, alleging that the company had improperly stopped paying benefits. The disability policy contained an arbitration clause requiring the costs of the arbitration to be " 'equally split among the parties.' " (Boghos, at p. 500.) The insurer moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed, relying on Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) and Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) for the proposition that the insured could not be required to pay any type of expense in arbitration that he would not incur in court. The Supreme Court reversed, stating: "The insured asks us to extend the holdings of Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83, and Little, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1064, to insurance disputes and to declare the policy's arbitration clause unenforceable because it requires him to share with the Underwriters the costs of arbitration and the arbitrators' fees. We find no merit in the request. Even if the holdings in Armendariz and Little might conceivably be extended beyond the employment context to cover other types of unwaivable claims based on or tethered to statutes, the insured's claims for nonpayment of benefits and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot properly be so described. His claim that the Underwriters have failed to pay benefits under the policy is a claim for breach of contract, pure and simple. His claim that the Underwriters have, by failing to pay, violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may properly be described either as a tort claim ... or as a special type of contract claim for which we allow tort damages ... . Insurance bad faith claims ... cannot properly be described as tethered to a statute, in the sense that Tameny claims subject to arbitration under Little are necessarily '"based on policies 'carefully tethered to fundamental policies ... delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions . ...' " ' ... While the business of insurance is sufficiently affected with a public interest to justify its regulation by the state ... , the fact of regulation does not suffice to demonstrate that any given insurance-related claim entails an unwaivable statutory right, or that any given claim seeks to enforce a public policy articulated in a statute. "In any event, we have not extended the Armendariz/Little cost-shifting rule to common law claims generally. The rule is a judicially created exception to Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.2, which provides that the parties to an arbitration agreement do share costs 'unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides or the parties to the arbitration otherwise agree ... .' We justified our creation of the exception in Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83, by reasoning that section 1284.2 'is a default provision, and the agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim e.g., a FEHA claim is implicitly an agreement by the employer to abide by the substantive remedial provisions of the statute' ... and to pay 'all types of cost that are unique to arbitration.' ... The same reasoning fairly covers common law Tameny claims, which must be carefully tethered to statutory or constitutional provisions ... , but not to common law claims generally. To extend Armendariz to the arbitration of claims not carefully tethered to statutory or constitutional provisions would seem an arbitrary refusal to enforce section 1284.2, a legislative act, and thus raise concerns about judicial policymaking ... ." (Boghos, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 507-508, citations & fn. omitted.)