In Borns v. Butts (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 208, a case involving comparative negligence issues, the jury determined that both parties were negligent and the negligence of each had contributed to plaintiff's injury, that plaintiff suffered $ 20,019 damages, and that plaintiff was 10 percent at fault and defendant 90 percent at fault. The jury in the Borns case was polled, and when it appeared that only seven of the jurors voted for all four verdicts, the defendant moved for a mistrial. The trial court refused to declare a mistrial or to send the jury back to deliberate further, and entered judgment on the verdict. The Court of Appeal reversed, saying in a brief opinion: "By entering a verdict when the same nine jurors had not agreed on each special verdict, the court erred. ( Earl v. Times-Mirror Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 165, 182-186 196 P. 57; Schoenbach v. Key System Transit Lines (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 302, 305 335 P.2d 725; Nelson v. Superior Court (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 119, 120-122 78 P.2d 1037.) "Respondent's contention that the error was harmless in light of the juror's voting pattern is rejected for two reasons. First, no 'legal verdict' existed below; thus, prejudice is inherent in the entry of an invalid verdict and judgment. (See Schoenbach v. Key System Transit Lines, supra, 168 Cal.App.2d at p. 305; Nelson v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.App.2d at pp. 122-123.) Second, the voting pattern was not such that we can say there was no prejudice. Juror No. 7 voted to find respondent not negligent (verdict 3), but he also voted to allocate 10 percent of the negligence to respondent (verdict 4). We cannot assume that if further deliberations were held and juror No. 7 were to switch his vote on verdict 3, thereby becoming part of the three-fourths majority, he would necessarily have continued to vote for the verdict finding respondent only 10 percent negligent. Juror No. 7's change of thought as to respondent's negligence may well have changed his thinking as to the proper allocation of negligence. In that case, he may not have continued to vote with the three-fourths majority on verdict 4. While it is possible that he might not have changed his fourth vote, we cannot say this would necessarily have occurred. Similar reasoning applies to juror No. 3. Thus, we cannot conclude that the error was harmless." ( Borns v. Butts, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at p. 210.)