In Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 959, a breast implant product liability case, the case had a lengthy history. In 1976, that plaintiff received silicone-gel-filled breast implants in an operation by Dr. Ryskamp. They were replaced within the year, and then in 1982, she was involved in an altercation that resulted in severe battery to her upper torso. In 1984, the plaintiff consulted additional physicians with respect to her arm problems, knowing that silicone had migrated down her arm and that it was causing her physical injury. Also, plaintiff suffered ulcerations in her arm which became progressively worse in 1984 or 1985, which she believed were caused by the battery on her breast, in turn causing the silicone to migrate into her arm. She sued her battery assailant in 1983, also consulting attorneys at that time concerning a possible claim against Dr. Ryskamp. However, she claimed she "never suspected that her implant manufacturers might be responsible for her injuries until she had contacted her current attorney's firm after December 1990," and then sued the manufacturer April 1, 1991. ( Id. at p. 962.) Based on this sequence of events in Bristol-Myers, the Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiff's argument that while she might have had cause to sue her treating doctor, based on the knowledge she had from 1976 to 1983, she had no basis earlier for believing she had an action against the manufacturer of the silicone. It did not make any difference that the plaintiff "had been told, and she believed, that silicone was an inert substance which by itself would cause no harm, and plaintiff attributed all her difficulties either to the intentional tortfeasor who battered her or to her initially treating physician. As Jolly teaches us, however, this excuse will not suffice. When a plaintiff has cause to sue based on knowledge or suspicion of negligence the statute starts to run as to all potential defendants." ( Bristol-Myers, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 966.)