In City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Brandon) (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 767, the California Supreme Court compared the nature of discoverability under Pitchess and Brady, noting that it is not a simple question of which doctrine embraces the other. "Our state statutory scheme allowing defense discovery of certain officer personnel records creates both a broader and lower threshold for discovery than does the high court's decision in Brady ." (Brandon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 14.) "Because Brady's constitutional materiality standard is narrower than the Pitchess requirements, any citizen complaint that meets Brady's test of materiality necessarily meets the relevance standard for disclosure under Pitchess. (Evid. Code, 1045, subd. (b).)" (Id. at p. 10.) This is because, under Pitchess, discoverable matter need not itself be admissible; it need only encompass information which may lead to relevant evidence. By contrast, the Brady rule concerns only information that is itself admissible and that implicates the fairness of the trial. On the other hand, the source from which information is accessible under Brady is broader than the information source accessible under Pitchess. Finally, Pitchess and Brady differ as to the procedure typically utilized to determine materiality. Whether the appellant has made a good faith showing of materiality under Pitchess is always preconviction, but under Brady, with its focus on whether the result of the proceeding would have been different, the determination is most frequently, although not exclusively, postconviction. (See Brandon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 8.) In City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Brandon) (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, the trial court granted a Pitchess motion and ordered disclosure of a 10-year-old complaint against the officer notwithstanding the prohibition in Evidence Code section 1045 against discovery of police personnel records in excess of five years old. The court of appeal affirmed the order, and the City of Los Angeles sought review. The Supreme Court held that, even though not required to do so, if a trial court undertakes a review of complaints more than five years old, then under Brady and Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40, 107 S. Ct. 989, the court may order disclosure of "information whose use at trial could be dispositive on either guilt or punishment . . . ." (Brandon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 15.) Thus, Brandon makes clear that (1) the court may undertake a Brady inquiry pretrial; and (2) certain limitations under Pitchess--there temporal--yield to Brady's constitutional mandate if germane to the issue of guilt.