Coachella Valley County Water Dist. v. Dreyfuss

In Coachella Valley County Water Dist. v. Dreyfuss (1979) 91 Cal. App. 3d 949, the condemning agency accepted defendant's demand after trial had begun. The Court agreed with defendant that the term "compensation" as used in section 1250.410 means compensation for the property taken, severance damages and any other consequential damages. ( Id. at p. 953.) It does not cover ordinary costs or interest on the award for prejudgment possession. (Ibid.) In Coachella Valley County Water Dist. v. Dreyfuss, plaintiff condemner offered $ 20,940 for the property in question. Defendants filed a valuation statement declaring that the fair market value of the property was $ 35,000 with severance damages of $ 27,000, but made a demand for $ 36,645. After the jury had been sworn, plaintiff chose to accept defendant's statutory demand and judgment was entered for $ 36,645. The trial court denied defendants' motion for litigation costs. In reversing the trial court, the Dreyfuss court observed: "The predecessor section ( 1249.3) provided that reasonableness was to be 'viewed in the light of the determination as to the value of the subject property.' We do not view the language in section 1250.410 requiring the court to also consider 'the evidence admitted' as meaning that litigation costs may be awarded only where the compensation has been determined by trial. Such a construction would lead to unreasonable and absurd results which would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the section . . . . If plaintiff's interpretation were adopted, a property owner would be precluded from seeking reimbursement of litigation expenses even if the condemning agency accepted the demand after the case had been submitted to the jury but before it returned its verdict. If the purpose of the statute is to make whole a property owner who has been required to litigate because of the condemner's unreasonable offer, the right to recover litigation costs should hinge, not on whether the amount of compensation has been determined by a jury verdict or a court finding, but on whether the property owner has been unreasonably required to litigate." ( Dreyfuss, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d 949, 956-957.)