In Cohan v. City of Thousand Oaks (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 547, a property developer obtained approval from the planning commission of an application to develop a parcel of property, though myriad conditions were imposed. The project was slated for city council review on only one matter: a permit for tree removal. Even so, at the next city council meeting--held three days prior to the end of the appeal period--several local citizens spoke against the project, and others sent letters urging the city council to appeal the planning commission decision. (Cohan, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at pp. 552-553.) So the council voted to waive state statutory 72-hour notice provisions (part of the Ralph M. Brown Act (Brown Act); Gov. Code, 54950 et seq.) and added the appeal to its agenda as an "urgency" matter, then voted to consider the entire project in about three weeks (the same time the tree permit was to be considered). (30 Cal.App.4th at p. 553.) Three weeks later, the city council conducted a noticed hearing on its appeal of the planning commission decision, at which 20 residents spoke against or submitted statements against the project. The council meeting ended with the council "granting the appeal" which rejected the entire project. (Cohan, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 553.) The developer then filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, a writ of mandate. The trial court acknowledged that the city council had not followed its own code or the state statutory notice provisions--indeed, unlike our case, the trial court ruled that the city council's appealing a decision to itself was "void"--but nonetheless concluded the council's process was "adequate" because of the likelihood that someone in the large number of opponents of the project would have filed an appeal within the remaining three days anyway. (Id. at p. 553.) The trial court's rationale was that the council would then have heard the matter anyway, the outcome would have been the same, so all errors were harmless. (Id. at pp. 553-554.) But the appellate court granted a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to reverse itself and enter a new order "nullifying" the "Council's appeal to itself." (Cohan, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 561.) It held the Brown Act notice violation was indeed harmless. (30 Cal.App.4th at p. 556.) But it zeroed in on the fact the city's municipal code did not entitle the council to bring an appeal to itself. In doing that, said the court, the council "acted in an arbitrary and high-handed manner." (Id. at p. 558.) It was the fact "the Council, in its zeal, made sure the decision did not stand unchallenged," in the context of the lack of authority to initiate the appeal in the first place, that constituted a violation of the due process right to a fair procedure. (Id. at p. 559.) The Court held: "The Council ignored the very laws and regulations meant to ensure fair process concerning property development conflicts." (Id. at p. 560.) In short, the city council appealed a commission's decision to itself, without authority to do so, and without specifying reasons. Then at the public hearing council members subjected the developers to "wide-ranging concerns in an impromptu fashion." The appellate court found the city's appeal to itself illegal under its municipal code and further found the city's failure to issue findings or a written resolution until the developers filed their petition for writ of mandate violative of the developers' due process rights. "As real estate developers, appellants took the risk that their proposed project may not be approved or, if approved, may be severely conditioned. They may even incur the risk of a seemingly unfair decision. However, they should not be subjected to the blatant disregard of their due process rights. The Council simply submitted to the roar of the crowd." (Cohan v. City of Thousand Oaks, supra, 30 Cal. App. 4th 547, 557, 561.)