In Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1599, the corporation filed a legal malpractice suit on May 14, 1992. ( Id. at p. 1602.) Trial was ultimately set for May 11, 1994. (Ibid.) On that date, after the corporation announced it was ready for trial, the defendants moved to dismiss on the ground the plaintiff's corporate powers had been suspended on December 1, 1992. (Ibid.) As proof, the defendants submitted a certificate from the Secretary of State, dated March 21, 1994. However, the defendants had not mentioned this issue in the April 25, 1994, pretrial conference report, as required by the terms of the report. (Ibid .) The trial court nevertheless denied the corporation's request for a continuance and dismissed the complaint. (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed, stating: "Suspension of corporate powers results in a lack of capacity to sue, not a lack of standing to sue. . . . 'A plea of lack of capacity of a corporation to maintain an action by reason of a suspension of corporate powers for nonpayment of its taxes "is a plea in abatement which is not favored in law and is to be strictly construed . . . ."' "The distinction is significant because a plea in abatement such as lack of capacity to sue 'must be raised by defendant at the earliest opportunity or it is waived. . . . The proper time to raise a plea in abatement is in the original answer or by demurrer at the time of the answer. It is a technical objection and must be pleaded specifically. Thus an affirmative defense or demurrer which contains a general assertion that plaintiff has not stated a cause of action does not suffice to raise a plea in abatement. .'" ( Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1603- 1604.) Color-Vue further stated: "Once a plea in abatement is waived, 'the court will be rarely justified in permitting the defense to be made later.' In the unusual circumstance where a corporation announces that it does not intend to pay its delinquent taxes, the trial court may properly relieve a defendant from his waiver and permit him to assert the corporation's lack of capacity to sue. Here, however, Color-Vue clearly stated its intention to pay its delinquent taxes. Indeed, Color-Vue obtained a certificate of revivor two weeks after respondents first raised the issue of overdue taxes and was in good standing when the trial court entered its judgment. The trial court simply overlooked the fact that the 'main purpose of the statutory suspension is to collect a tax,' and that the defendants are 'only . . . incidental beneficiaries of that law.' Given Color-Vue's willingness to pay taxes, the trial court had no basis for relieving defendants from their waiver of the plea." ( Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1605.)