In Cooper v. Bray (1978) 21 Cal.3d 841, the California Supreme Court found that section 17158 was unconstitutional because it inflicted upon owner-passengers who are injured a burden that is not borne by any other class of accident victims without there being any rational basis for this disparate treatment. The court rejected that line of reasoning which supported Schwalbe v. Jones (1976) 16 Cal.3d 514 and its progeny. For example, disparate treatment cannot be justified on the theory of encouraging the careful selection and supervision of permissive drivers because the passenger has no effective right of control over such drivers. Moreover, the statute, in barring all owners who are passengers actually draws no distinction between those who are careful in selecting drivers and those who are not. To underscore the point, the statute permits recovery if the passenger owner selects as a driver either an intoxicated person or one who engages in willful misconduct, thereby negating any possibility that the statute's purpose could be to enhance careful selection. The court laid to rest, also, the rationale that it was the intent of the Legislature to insulate negligent permissive drivers from liability since the Vehicle Code Sections 17150-17153 imposes primary liability on the negligent permissive driver who negligently injures third parties, and the owner-passenger who negligently chose him is secondarily liable. Moreover, such intent could not be inferred because it is the basic policy of the state as expressed in Civil Code section 1714 that every person is responsible for his negligent acts. The court viewed the section as operating simply to relieve the driver's insurer from a risk which he had assumed by agreement.