In Cranston v. City of Richmond (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 755, a city employee challenged a personnel rule that permitted the city to discharge him for " 'conduct unbecoming an employee of the City Service.' " He argued the rule violated due process because unbecoming conduct was too vague a standard to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct was proscribed. ( Cranston v. City of Richmond, supra, 40 Cal. 3d at pp. 762-763.) The Cranston court rejected the employee's initial argument that the rule was unconstitutionally vague in the abstract because courts do not ordinarily determine vagueness challenges in the abstract but instead examine whether the rule is vague as applied to the facts of the specific case. The employee, recognizing this general approach, argued the court may nevertheless invalidate a rule for facial invalidity when it is so vague and devoid of objective meaning that it provides no standard at all and makes it impossible to determine whether his particular conduct was within the core of proscribed conduct. ( Id. at pp. 764-765.) Responding to this argument, Cranston stated at page 765: "We disagree with appellant that the rule provides no standard at all. It is true that, considered in isolation, the term ' "unbecoming" has no inherent, objective content from which ascertainable standards defining the proscribed conduct can be fashioned.' However, the rule does not exist, and we do not apply it, in isolation. A number of California cases have held that where the language of a statute fails to provide an objective standard by which conduct can be judged, the required specificity may nonetheless be provided by the common knowledge and understanding of members of the particular vocation or profession to which the statute applies." The italicized language shows that Cranston held only that, when assessing whether a person of ordinary intelligence would understand what comportment was required by a regulation, an otherwise ambiguous standard may find the requisite specificity by reference to the particular profession and its "standards of probity" ( Cranston v. City of Richmond, supra, 40 Cal. 3d at p. 769) that are commonly known and understood by members of that profession. Cranston does not hold that the intended scope of a statutory description of disclosable materials may be narrowed or expanded by consulting the understanding of those who are subject to its requirements.