In Cruey v. Gannett Co., Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 356, a discharged employee (Cruey) sued a former co-worker for libel and slander arising out of complaints the co-worker had made to their employer and the EEOC, accusing the discharged employee of sexual harassment and other improprieties. ( Cruey, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 361, 366-367.) The co-worker moved for summary judgment on the ground that her complaints were privileged. On appeal, the discharged employee argued that even if the statements were privileged, the co-worker had waived the privilege by failing to raise it in her answer. The Court of Appeal disagreed. The court observed: "Although the general rule is that a privilege must be pled as an affirmative defense , recent California authority suggests an exception where the complaint alleges facts indicating applicability of a defense or where the affirmative defense is raised during a summary judgment proceeding. . . . Given the long-standing California court policy of exercising liberality in permitting amendments to pleadings at any stage of the proceedings and of disregarding errors or defects in pleadings unless substantial rights are affected , we believe that a party should be permitted to introduce the defense of privilege in a summary judgment procedure so long as the opposing party has adequate notice and opportunity to respond. Here, the defense of privilege was asserted in the opening brief in the motion for summary judgment. Cruey took the opportunity to respond by arguing the inapplicability of the privilege. He has not shown that he was prejudiced by the process." ( Id. at p. 367.)