In Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecommunications Engineers (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1591, the court was dealing with a company's allegations that a consulting firm had tortiously interfered with the company's economic advantage by not recommending a customer purchase its systems. The SLAPP motion was brought by the consulting firm and granted by the trial court. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the motion to strike was not justified because the underlying action it attacked arose from the consulting firm's acts in performance of contractual obligations, and not from acts in furtherance of their right of free speech. The court explained, "Thus in determining whether a cause of action falls within the scope of the statute, we hold that the Legislature intended to include only those suits that are based upon acts that are primarily in furtherance of a person's constitutional right of free speech, i.e., acts which advance or promote that right. For it is only in those cases where the party acted for the purpose of promoting or advancing his or her right of free speech, in contrast to one where the parties are performing or breaching their contractual obligations, that the right could be chilled by the specter of an unfounded lawsuit. Here, the acts upon which plaintiff is relying in contending that defendants interfered with its prospective economic advantage are the same acts which could form the basis for an action by the customer, against defendant consulting firm, for breach of contract. If the customer rather than plaintiff had brought a suit seeking damages based upon theories of breach of contract or misrepresentation, it would be an absurdity to suggest the customer's action would be barred by a defense of free speech. To do so would open the door to the applicability of section 425.16 to breach of contract or fraud actions where the act of the party relates to the formation or performance of contractual obligations and not with respect to the exercise of the right of free speech. Since the acts of defendant consulting firm, upon which the action here is based, were related to the performance of their contractual obligations, and were not motivated by their desire to promote or advance their right of free speech, the first prong of the test 425.16(b) has not been met." ( Ericsson GE, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1601-1602.)