In Estate of Shute (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 573, the decedent made a 1930 will, leaving an annuity to her husband's brother, with the residue to her sisters and her brother. In 1937, she executed a second will, containing no express revocation of the first, altering the prior annuity, making a number of bequests to third parties, and leaving the residue to her sisters alone. Subsequently, she revoked the second will, and the trial court refused to admit the first will to probate on the grounds that it had been revoked by the later will. On appeal by proponents of the 1930 will, the appellate court reversed, and directed the admission of the 1930 will to probate as written, holding at pages 578-579: "Regardless of the terms used its the second will's real effect was to amend the provisions of the earlier will, and while it made certain changes, additions and alterations in the manner of distribution provided in the first will, it kept the larger part of those provisions intact and left the larger part of the estate to the same persons and in the same manner as in the first will. There is no evidence to sustain the court's finding or conclusion that the second will was not intended to be amendatory of or a codicil to the first will. Not only was the second instrument in effect a codicil, but under the provisions of section 72 of the Probate Code its execution did not revoke the first will. This being true, and no other testamentary instrument having been left in force and effect by the deceased, the first will should have been admitted to probate . . . . The decedent having intentionally revoked an instrument which was in practical effect a codicil, no inconsistency remains which nullifies any part of the first will and the same should be accepted as the last will of the decedent."