In F & P Growers Assn. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 667, the employer refused to continue bargaining with the originally certified union in that case, the UFW, because allegedly "objective criteria revealed that a majority of employees in the bargaining unit no longer supported the UFW ... ." (F&P Growers, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 670.) The employer had argued that since the NLRA's rebuttable presumption rule had been found applicable to the ALRA, other related NLRA precedents likewise should be adopted, including the rule allowing an employer to refuse to bargain with a certified union if the employer had a good faith belief that the union had lost its majority support. (F&P Growers, supra, at pp. 672-677.) In resolving that issue, the Court of Appeal concluded that the loss of majority support defense to bargaining with a particular union was clearly inapplicable to the ALRA because of important differences between the ALRA and the NLRA. (F&P Growers, supra, at pp. 674-676.) For example, the NLRA permitted an employer to bargain with a union that had demonstrated its majority status by means other than an election, but the ALRA only allowed an employer to bargain with a union that had won an election. Moreover, the NLRA permitted employers to petition for an election, but the ALRA did not allow employers to file election petitions regarding the certification or decertification of a union. (F&P Growers, supra, at pp. 674-678.) As noted in F&P Growers, these distinctive provisions of the ALRA indicated the Legislature did not intend for an agricultural employer to participate in deciding whether or not it shall bargain with a particular union. Such choice was left solely to the employees, and was removed from the employer. (F&P Growers, supra, at pp. 677-678.) For these reasons, the Court of Appeal held that employers could not refuse to bargain with a particular union based on a good faith belief in loss of majority status, since that would allow employers to do indirectly (i.e., effectively decertify a union) what the Legislature had removed from the employer's purview. (Id. at p. 677.) In F&P Growers, the Court of Appeal explained the implications in that case of this rule against per se relief: "Even though the employer may have had no right to be involved in deciding whether it would or would not bargain with UFW, the Board still was required to examine the employer's conduct for particular facts and circumstances to see if the make whole remedy was appropriate. The fact that we now hold that the employer was required to bargain with UFW regardless of its good faith belief does not negate the discretionary nature of the make whole relief under the statute. ... Even though that belief is no defense for failure to bargain, the language of the statute is clear that the Board issue the make whole relief only when it 'deems' the relief appropriate." (F&P Growers, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 681.) In F&P Growers, the Board had adopted a particular standard for deciding on whether make whole relief was appropriate. That standard was as follows: "'We consider on a case-by-case basis the extent to which the public interest in the employer's position weighs against the harm done to the employees by its refusal to bargain. Unless litigation of the employer's position furthers the policies and purposes of the ALRA, the employer, not the employees, should ultimately bear the financial risk of its choice to litigate rather than bargain.'" (F&P Growers, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 682.) The Court of Appeal held that the above standard was a proper method for the Board to use in determining whether make whole relief was appropriate: "The Board used its own standards in determining appropriateness of the remedy in this particular case, and this they were entitled to do." (Id. at p. 682.) Nevertheless, in applying that standard as a framework for determining the appropriateness of the remedy, the Board still must reach its decision in a discretionary (not a per se) manner based on the facts and equities of the particular case. As the Court of Appeal stated: "Since the Board in the instant case did in fact examine the facts and circumstances of the particular case, and did not apply the make whole remedy per se or automatically, but applied it only after it exercised discretion and deemed that relief appropriate, the order herein was not an abuse of discretion. ... The language of the Board's decision shows that they knew they had to examine each case individually, and the language of their decision indicates that they examined the case on a case-by-case basis." (Ibid.)