In Foothill Federal Credit Union v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 632, the plaintiffs alleged claims for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendant Foothill Federal Credit Union (FFCU) on the ground that FFCU's production of consumer records in response to a subpoena included personal financial records that had been expressly removed from the scope of the subpoena. (Id. at pp. 634-635.) In issuing a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to sustain a demurrer to the two causes of action, the court reasoned that the elements necessary for application of the litigation privilege were met. First, the disclosure of the records was a communication made in the course of judicial proceedings, as "in the context of the pending litigation, the counsel of record for a party issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring FFCU to produce documents." (Id. at p. 635.) Second, "FFCU was a participant authorized by law, as it was brought into the proceedings by the issuance of the subpoena ordering it to produce the specified documents. " (Id. at pp. 635-636.) Third, responding to the subpoena was a communication made to achieve the objects of the litigation, given that "the documents were produced to provide the party who subpoenaed them with potential evidence in the litigation." (Id. at p. 636.) Finally, the subpoenaed records bore some relation to the action, as they were sought as part of a probate proceeding to support an allegation of elder financial abuse. (Ibid.) Importantly, the court rejected one of appellant's arguments here, which is that Dr. Ballin was not a "participant authorized by law" because his production preceded expiration of the time limits afforded by section 1985.3. (See Foothill, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 636 real parties argued "the purposes of the litigation privilege are not served by granting immunity under the privilege to a custodian of records who discloses them in a manner not compliant with section 1985.3".) Section 1985.3 "requires that consumers be informed when certain personal records have been subpoenaed, and it offers them the opportunity to challenge that subpoena before the documents sought are produced." (Foothill, supra, at p. 639.) Explaining that "section 1985.3 offers a consumer a 'statutory procedural mechanism for enforcing his or her right to privacy,'" the court found that the statute neither made the custodian of records a guarantor of the consumer's privacy nor created a private right of action against the custodian for violation of the section. (Ibid.) Thus, the court reasoned that "section 1985.3 does not prescribe or proscribe conduct by the recipient of the subpoena, and it does not remotely establish that erroneously broad disclosure of documents is actionable." (Ibid.) Accordingly, it ruled that application of the litigation privilege to bar an action based on the alleged improper disclosure of confidential records did not violate the purpose and effect of section 1985.3. (Foothill, supra, at pp. 641-642.) "Contrary to real parties in interest's claim, it does not frustrate the purpose of section 1985.3 to apply the litigation privilege to suits against custodians of records because section 1985.3 neither contemplates nor provides recourse for a consumer against those custodians." (Id. at p. 642.)