Gage v. Jordan

In Gage v. Jordan (1944) 23 Cal.2d 794, the court had to interpret constitutional provisions for exercise of statewide initiative power. The specific provision, former California Constitution, article IV, section 1 provided in essence, upon presentation to the Secretary of State of a petition certified to have been signed by qualified electors equal in number to 8 percent of the votes cast for gubernatorial candidates "at the last preceding general election," the Secretary of State "shall submit" the proposition to the electorate "at the next succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130 days after the presentation aforesaid of said petition . . . " or at any sooner special election called by the Governor in his discretion. That provision was part of a larger scheme with a number of rigorous time deadlines. Petitions were circulated in counties or cities. Although circulation in sections was permitted, all sections within each geographic unit were to be presented at the same time and the signatures had to be checked within 20 days. Then the clerk was to "forthwith" transmit the petition to the Secretary of State, who should likewise "forthwith" transmit his certificate of receipt. Supplemental petitions could be filed with the local official within 40 days of transmission of the petition to the Secretary. Ten days were allowed to verify supplemental signatures. Then the above-quoted language came into play, requiring placement of qualified petitions on the ballot "at the next succeeding general election" more than 130 days after presentation. Another provision stated in certain specific instances where negligence or malfeasance had occurred, initiatives not submitted "at the election specified" might be submitted at a later general election. The court had to determine what constituted "presentation" and what base election determined the number of signatures needed to qualify. The factual context involved a petition submitted for the 1940 election, which had failed to qualify. At the next election in 1942, fewer electors voted. Based on that election, the petition had enough signatures. The issue was whether the petition could then be submitted to the voters at the next election, presumably 1944, or whether it had no further life after failing to qualify in 1940. The court's holding was it could not be resubmitted at any later election than 1940, or as the court said, it could not be "revitalized." The reasons the court gave for that conclusion were the time limitations and the overall structure of the relevant provisions necessarily implied a limited life for the petition, bounded by the occurrence of the "next succeeding general election" more than 130 days after presentation. (That concept was further defined as the date the first section was filed with the Secretary of State.) The legislative intent was a petition was presented for one, and only one, particular election and had to qualify for that election alone, based on the number of electors voting in the immediately previous election, i.e., the election before presentation. Such a result, according to the court, maximized the probability an initiative petition submitted at election A would be supported by a significant percentage of persons qualified to vote at election A. The petition would have sufficient contemporaneous support. "In other words, it is intended that the signers of the petition shall be qualified electors at the time of signing and that the measure shall be submitted at the next general election, at which they are qualified to vote. As electors change each year, through death, coming of age, removal, neglect to qualify, and the like, any construction of section 1, supra, which would permit the qualified electors of one year to determine largely the measures liable to go on the ballot in a subsequent year would lead to confusion and uncertainty, and would be contrary to public policy." ( Gage v. Jordan, supra, 23 Cal.2d 794, 804.)